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Abstract 
Democratization in Southeast Asia has long been of scholarly interests, particularly 
following the Third Wave, which saw the democratization of the Philippines, Thailand, 
and Indonesia, as well as the political liberalization of Malaysia, Singapore, and 
Cambodia. However, excitements over democracy were soon overshadowed by 
creeping doubts over their survivability. By the 2000s, democratization has either 
decelerated or regressed in some of the region’s most strategic countries, most notably 
Thailand and the Philippines. As ASEAN is on the verge of liberalization, this poses 
negative implications to the organization as well. 
 
This paper seeks to identify common variables that threaten democratic institutions in 
Southeast Asia. Scholars of Southeast Asia have proposed numerous variables that 
threaten the region’s young democracies, ranging from the system of government to 
geographic attributes. This paper will not attempt to identify a new variable. Rather, it 
will assess the three dominant approaches in the study of democratic survival in the 
region – socioeconomic, structural, and ethnic and cultural – in order to identify what 
common challenges threaten Southeast Asia’s democratic institutions. In order to do 
so, this paper will also adopt a unique approach to the topic by primarily focusing on 
the period between 2000 and 2010, which has seen the beginning of the gradual decline 
of democratic progression in many parts of Southeast Asia. Rather than conduct a 
region-wide study, it will primarily focus on three of the region’s biggest democracies: 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. By adopting this nuanced approach to the 
study of democratic survival in Southeast Asia, this paper has uncovered that the 
biggest factors that contribute to the gradual deceleration or regression of the 
democratization process were unstable elite relations and a power struggle between 
members of the elite, at large, and the middle class. The variety of variables that shape 
this power balance determine the life length and stability of democratic institutions. 
 
This paper’s primary contribution to the literature is its unique approach to the study 
of democratic survival. By focusing on the period between 2000 and 2010, it has 
managed to find evidence for the structuralist and cultural arguments that actors, 
political culture, and ethnic conflict shape the democratization process. But it has also 
managed to disprove the dominant socioeconomic approach that argue that 
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socioeconomic factors pose significant risks to the democratization process in the 
region. With this primary contribution, this paper also hopes to add on to further 
discussions on the impact of structural actors of the region’s young democracies on 
the future of ASEAN as a whole. 
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1 
Democracy under siege 
 
Within the study of political science in the post-Cold War era, significant scholarly 
and media attention has been directed toward the rise of democracies and the collapse 
of authoritarian regimes. In Southeast Asia1, the rise of democracies and the 
liberalization of political systems in strategic countries has, in recent decades, 
influenced how countries in the region behave, interact, and, according to some 
scholars, provide the empowerment necessary for the Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations (ASEAN) to become a more effective inter-governmental organization.2 Once 
home to some of the most resilient and repressive governments in the developing 
world, the region has now seen the proliferation of some of the most effective 
democratic movements in the 20th century. The 1986 downfall of Ferdinand Marcos 
in the Philippines began the so-called “Third wave of democracy” in Asia, inspiring 
freedom and democracy movements all over the region.3 Not long after Marcos’ fall, 
Thailand and Indonesia witnessed significant changes to their political systems, as 
authoritarian regimes fell and were replaced with governments that are far more open 
to opposition and institutional reform. Even Malaysia and Singapore, home to some 
of the strongest and most entrenched governments in the region, faced a gradual, but 
significant period of political liberalization. 
  
However, the region’s excitement with democracy was short-lived, as by the late-
2000s, democratization in the region stalled and, in some of the region’s more strategic 
countries, the trend has reversed. From the re-implementation of the 2012 Internal 
Security Act in Malaysia to the 2014 military overthrow of Thai Prime Minister 
Niwatthamrong Boonsongpaisan, some parts of the region are witnessing a drastic 
rollback of democratic progress. Only the Philippines and Indonesia have stayed 
                                                          
1 For the sake of familiarity, this paper will adopt the United Nations’ categorization of Southeast Asia. 
The countries listed are Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 
Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste, and Vietnam. See here: “United Nations Statistic Division - 
Standard Country and Area Codes Classification”, last revised 31 October 2013, 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49regin.htm 
2 See Acharya, Amitav. “Southeast Asia's Democratic Moment”. Asian Survey, 39:3 (1999): 418-432; 
Villacorta, Wilfrido V. “Inter-regional Cooperation in Democracy Building: Prospects for Enhanced 
ASEAN-EU Engagement”. International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance (2009). 
3 Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. (Norman: 
University of Oklahoma Press, 1991) 
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relatively on track. However, even in these two countries, democratic institutions are 
under threat from public distrust, rampant corruption, and ongoing political dominance 
of figures from past authoritarian regimes. The question that now looms large within 
scholarly debates is what explains the sudden deceleration or regression of 
democratization in Southeast Asia? 
 
Scholarly discussions over Southeast Asia’s rollback from democracy mounted 
following the 2006 overthrow of Thaksin Shinawatra. Nonetheless, the topic of 
democratic survival has continued to attract significant interest from scholars of 
comparative politics in Southeast Asia since the downfall of Marcos, as the question 
that arises from a period of democratic transition is how to ensure that democracy 
remains as ‘the only game in town’.4 The literature on democratic survival in Southeast 
Asia is large and rich with various hypotheses suggesting socioeconomic, political, 
and cultural reasons behind the attacks (or preservation) of democratic institutions in 
the young democracies and hybrid regimes. Countless variables, ranging from systems 
of government to geographic attributes, have been suggested by scholars to explain 
the outcomes of the region’s democratization processes. However, three main 
approaches, which cover a variety of endogenous variables, have emerged within 
scholarly debate. 
 
The first approach focuses on socioeconomic variables, such as income inequality and 
lower levels of modernization, as causes for democratic regime survival or regression. 
A dominant approach in the study of democratic survival, its proponents, many of 
whom are political modernists, argue that economic factors, play an important role in 
shaping the behaviour of actors within society, which in turn act to remove or preserve 
democratic institutions.5 The second approach looks at the role of actors, such as the 
military and parliament, in shaping the structural foundations of democracy. These 
actors act as either an obstruction or driver to the democratization process6. Proponents 
                                                          
4 Linz, Juan J. & Stepan, Alfred. "Toward Consolidated Democracies". Journal of Democracy 7:2 
(1996): 15 
5 See Lipset, Seymour Martin. "Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and 
Political Legitimacy". The American Political Science Review 53:1 (1959): 69-105; Przeworski, Adam 
and Limongi, Fernando. "Modernization: Theories and Facts". World Politics 49:2 (1997): 155-183; 
Marsh, Ian et al. Democracy, governance, and economic performance: East and Southeast Asia. 
(Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1999). 
6 See Slater, Dan. "Democracies and Dictatorships Do Not Float Freely: Structural Sources of Political 
Regimes in Southeast Asia". in Southeast Asia in Political Science: Theory, Region, and Qualitative 
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of this approach are concerned with the supporting institutions that have shaped the 
performance, cohesion, and prospects for survival of democracies, as they believe that 
democratization surround organizational collision. A third approach is the cultural and 
ethnic approach, which is concerned with public and state perceptions of democracy. 
Proponents of this approach point to the role of culture, values, and ethnicity as 
obstacles to the liberal principles of democracy.7 
 
Studies of democratic survival in Southeast Asia reflect the greater scholarly concern 
over democracy’s erratic history in Southeast Asia and the by-products of democratic 
institutions in liberalizing Southeast Asia as a whole. This raises ongoing scholarly 
contentions regarding the importance of democracy for peace, collaboration, 
cooperation, regionalism, and foreign policy behaviour more generally.8 ASEAN has 
remained a unique regional organization. Despite historically being known as a “club 
of dictators”, ASEAN has been very effective in preserving regional peace and 
stability amongst its member-states.9 However, the post-Cold War has posed unique 
challenges to the relationship amongst member-states. The collapse of communism as 
a serious threat to regime survival has weakened the political legitimacy of some 
leaders; increased international attention on human rights issues has divided ASEAN 
countries over Myanmar’s human rights abuses; and trans-border issues, such as 
refugees and haze, have put the organization’s core value of “non-interference” into 
question. The gradual political liberalization of the region’s countries have resulted in 
a greater willingness to slowly look beyond the “ASEAN Way” in order to collaborate 
and solve interstate issues. However, as the region’s democratization processes slow 
down or regress, would this willingness to collaborate on internal issues remain the 
                                                          
Analysis, ed. Slater, Dan et al. (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2008); Crouch, Harold. & Morley, 
James. "The Dynamics of Political Change". in Driven by Growth: political Change in the Asia-Pacific 
Region. ed by Morley, James. (Armonk: M.E. Sharpe, 1993); Winters, Jeffrey. "Oligarchy and 
Democracy in Indonesia". Indonesia 96 (2013): 11-33 
7 See Pye, Lucian et al. Asian Power and Politics (Cambridge, USA: Harvard University Press, 1985); 
Neher, Clark D. "Asian Style Democracy". Asian Survey 34:11 (1994): 949-961; Dalton, Russell & 
Ong, Nhu-Ngoc T. "Authority Orientations and Democratic Attitudes: A Test of the "Asian Values" 
Hypothesis". Japanese Journal of Political Science 6:2 (2005): 1-21. 
8 Acharya, Amitav. "Democratising Southeast Asia: Economic Crisis and Political Change". Asia 
Research Centre (1998): 10-14 
9 Phil Robertson. "ASEAN's road to nowhere? Subverting standards within the ASEAN Human Rights 
Declaration". Strategic Review, 1 May 2013, accessed 18 October 2014. http://www.sr-
indonesia.com/web-exclusives/view/asean-s-road-to-nowhere-subverting-standards-within-the-asean-
human-rights-declaration 
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same? With this overarching question in mind, there is a strong need to conduct a 
comparative analysis to identify similarities in the region’s democratization processes. 
 
The purpose of this paper is to revisit these three approaches through a comparative 
analysis that covers three key countries in Southeast Asia – Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand – and assess how recent and significant domestic developments affect, 
validate, or detract from the key propositions in each of the three cases. In the process, 
the thesis will identify what common socioeconomic, structural, and cultural and 
ethnic variables are responsible for protecting or weakening the democratization 
process. The main research question is “given the developments of the past decade, 
what are the key variables that challenge the survivability of democratic institutions 
in Southeast Asia?” While there have been numerous attempts by scholars to conduct 
comparative research on the democratization processes in Southeast Asia, an empirical 
investigation of variables from all three approaches concerning their relevance to 
democratic survival is rare. Moreover, researches that attempt to identify shared 
factors and variables within Southeast Asia’s polities have received much criticism 
from scholars who outline the region’s complex political diversity. However, it is this 
paper’s argument that such research deserves further consideration for its 
interdisciplinary nature and focus, along with its distinctive findings concerning the 
impact of each set of variables on the other.  
 
This paper has found that there are four key commonalities that hamper the 
democratization process: weak political parties, the political influence of the military, 
ethnic conflict, and the authoritarian influence of the “Asian values” on state 
institutions. The first two are structural variables while the latter two are cultural and 
ethnic variables. The influence of unstable elite relations and a power struggle between 
members of the elite, at large, and the middle class have shaped the progress of 
democratization in the region. This paper has also found that, as argued by a number 
of scholars in the past, the two dominant socioeconomic variables of income inequality 
and lower levels of modernization are not common variables that threaten democratic 
institutions in Southeast Asia. Nonetheless, socioeconomic factors may ensure that 
democratization will not entirely regress. 
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This paper is not downplaying the complexity of the region’s complicated 
democratization processes. Indeed, there are numerous other variables that may 
contribute to the mixed outcome of the democratization process. After all, there is not 
one single pathway in the democratization process and there will be no similar 
outcome. However, the impacts of the aforementioned variables on the region’s young 
democracies have created an impact that will not only define the future of each 
country’s political systems, but also its behaviour with other countries in the region. 
 
Defining democracy 
 
Before this paper continues on its intended discussion, it is firstly important to discuss 
how it seeks to approach the concept of “democracy” in Southeast Asia. While 
“democracy” has become a globally recognized concept, its definition remains one of 
the most debated topics in political science. However, there has been no clear 
consensus within academia over what characteristics a democracy entails. In the mid-
20th century, there are three major approaches that have emerged from debates over 
the meaning of democracy. These approaches focus on democracy as a source of 
authority for the government, the purposes a democratic government serves, and the 
procedures for establishing and constituting a government.10 The first two focus on a 
normative definition of democracy and are concerned with the sources of power within 
a state (e.g. separation of power, no monopolistic influences over state officials) and 
the effectiveness of “democratic” institutions in achieving idealistic goals (e.g. handle 
corruption and income inequality).11 The third approach is a procedural definition of 
democracy, which focuses on the institutions and means that a government is selected 
into power. There were great debates over these three approaches, but from the 1970s 
onwards, the procedural definition of the concept eventually “won”, as it provided a 
more empirical, institutional, and measurable definition of the term.12 This paper will 
focus on a procedural definition of democracy for this reason. 
 
                                                          
10 Huntington, Samuel. Third Wave of Democratization, 6 
11 This paper provides good explanations on the normative definitions of democracy: Maoz, Zeev & 
Russett, Bruce. "Normative and Structural Causes of Democratic Peace, 1946-1986" in The American 
Political Science Review 87:3 (1993): 624-638 
12 Huntington, Samuel. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century, 6 
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Austrian-American political scientist Joseph Schumpeter was amongst the first and 
most prominent proponents of the procedural definition. Schumpeter defines 
democracy as an ‘institutional arrangement for arriving at political decisions in which 
individuals acquire the power to decide by means of a competitive struggle for the 
people’s vote’.13 This minimalist definition of “democracy” has not only shaped the 
way scholars conceptualized democracy in coming decades, but it has shaped the way 
policymakers and members of civil society organizations defined and conceptualized 
democracy. The underlying features that sets a democratic form of government apart 
from others is the way in which the leaders of a country are selected. Unlike other 
forms of governments (e.g. military juntas, communist/fascist regimes), where the 
leaders are selected by appointment or through violence, leaders of democratic 
regimes are selected through competitive elections. Dahl expands on Schumpeter’s 
definition to argue that a democracy must also have a contestation and participation 
dimension, which ensures the existence of civil and political freedoms and the 
existence of effective opposition groups.14 A contestation dimension is particularly 
important in a contemporary democracy, as it creates a greater separation of power 
that takes power away from serving governments to opposition groups and other 
bodies in the state or within society. 
 
This paper will adopt a combination of the procedural definitions provided by 
Schumpeter and Dahl. Thus, this paper will define a “democracy” as a form of 
government that ensures the freedom of all adult citizens to politically participate or 
contest in free and fair elections, as well as protect their rights to free speech and 
assembly. Thus, a state is undemocratic if it does not allow sections of its citizenry to 
vote, if opposition groups face harassment and/or are not allowed to participate in 
elections, and if there are any attempts by the government to illegally prolong power 
(e.g. vote manipulation, cancelling elections). Indeed, a procedural definition of 
democracy is minimalist. Critics of the procedural approach, such as McEllheny, argue 
that it reduces the notion of democracy and abandons the ‘the pre-determined goals of 
classical democratic doctrines, the nineteenth century models based on community 
                                                          
13 Schumpeter, Joseph. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy (1942. Reprint, Radford: Wilder 
Publications, 2012) 269 
14 Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971) 
1-9 
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consensus on a common good’.15 In a paper focusing on democratic survival in 
Southeast Asia, it may seem that a normative approach of “democracy” may be better, 
as it can focus on whether the objectives of democratic movements, such as the 
eradication of corruption and removal of authoritarian elites from power, have been 
successful. However, there is too much difficulty in using the approach in this way. 
For example, how could one effectively measure the continuous success of prominent 
normative democratic ideals, such as informed and rational deliberation and equal 
participation and power of all groups?  
 
Therefore, the procedural definition is as Huntington maintains as ‘necessarily 
minimal’.16 By using this approach, this paper will primarily focus on the protection 
of two democratic institutions: free and fair elections and free speech. Due to the 
limitations of the research topic and word count, this paper will not divulge into 
discussions on the purposes of a democratic government or put together a checklist of 
objectives put forward by the region’s democratic movements to assess the 
effectiveness of governments during the democratic transition period. Rather, it is 
concerned with the survivability of the two aforementioned democratic institutions. 
Variables from all three of the approaches mentioned in the previous sections of this 
chapter have played an important role in contributing to the democratization process 
in Southeast Asia. However, as this chapter will explain in the next few chapters, these 
same variables may contribute to the actions that weaken the democratization process. 
 
There are two additional definitions that must be distinguished in this paper, which are 
“democratic transition” and “democratic consolidation”, both of which are 
fundamental components of the democratization process that precedes a consolidated 
democracy. For the purpose of this paper, it will adopt the definitions of Juan Linz and 
Alfred Stepan, prominent scholars of democracy studies. Linz and Stepan define 
“democratic transition” as the first process of democratization when actors try to reach 
an agreement about the free and fair political procedure of electing governments, when 
this government has the de facto authority to generate new policies, and when the 
legislative, executive, and judicial power generated by the new democracy does not 
                                                          
15 McElhenny, Shaun. "Minimalist Conception of Democracy: A Normative Analysis". (PhD diss., New 
York University, 2004). 
16 Huntington. Third Wave of Democratization. 8 
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have to share power with the other bodies de jure.17 A period of “democratic 
consolidation” is contrasted as a time when key institutions of democracies (e.g. free 
and episodic elections, freedom of speech) are practiced, but there continues to be 
behavioural and actoral factors that prevents democracy from being ‘the only game in 
town’.18 These two definitions are in sync with the Schumpeter-Dahl definition that 
this paper seeks to adopt, as it focuses on state acceptance and recognition of key 
democratic institutions. Thus, this paper will adopt the Linz-Stepan definition of 
democratic transition and consolidation. 
 
Democratization in Southeast Asia 
 
Southeast Asia’s political topography is diverse and complicated. Any attempt to 
identify common variables that explain episodes of political change in the region 
would be fraught with this difficulty. The Bertelsmann Transformation Index 
identifies three sets of government types in Southeast Asia. They are closed 
authoritarian governments (Brunei, Laos, Vietnam, and Myanmar) moderate electoral 
authoritarianism (Cambodia, Malaysia, and Singapore), and defective democracies 
(Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, and Timor-Leste).19 During the Third Wave, 
Southeast Asia saw radical political transformations in four countries: the Philippines 
(1986), Thailand (1992), Cambodia (1993), and Indonesia (1998). However, of these 
four countries, only the political systems of the Philippines, Thailand, and Indonesia 
have significantly liberalized following the period of authoritarian rule. Cambodia’s 
democratic transition was fraught with problems and gross human rights violations, 
amid attempts by Hun Sen’s ruling party to maintain power.20 Thus, Cambodia’s 
political system has never managed to achieve significant democratic achievements. 
 
On the other hand, during periods of their democratic consolidation, Indonesia, the 
Philippines, and Thailand have faced considerable progress in the promotion of civil 
and political rights. They have empowered civil society organizations (CSOs), 
                                                          
17 Linz & Stepan. "Toward Consolidated Democracies". 14-20 
18 Ibid, 15  
19 "Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index 2014", Bertelsmann Stiftung’s Transformation Index, 
accessed 1 October 2014. http://www.bti-project.org/index/  
20 Sopheap Chak. "Democracy in Cambodia: Progress, Challenges, and Pathway". in A Future for 
Democracy, ed. Hofmeister, Wilhelm (Singapore: Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011) 53-54 
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enhanced participatory politics, and seen the emergence of pro-reform figures to key 
political positions. Due to these democratic advancements, Freedom House has, at 
some point during their period of democratic consolidation, ranked them as “free”.21 
The democratization movements of these three countries have significant implications 
for the entire region. Acharya observes that the emergence of CSOs in these three 
countries have led to greater challenges to the “ASEAN model of elite-centric regional 
socialization” and greater demands for openness in Southeast Asian regionalism.22 
Additionally, within the past two decades, these three countries have been at the 
forefront of pushing forward pro-rights initiatives, such as the 2012 ASEAN Human 
Rights Declaration, which has liberalized the ways in which ASEAN has functioned. 
 
However, between 2000 and 2010, the progress in which democratization has taken 
place have either gradually or significantly slowed down. In the Philippines and 
Thailand, the weakening of parliament, the prevalence of money politics, and gross 
violations of human rights in conflict regions have resulted in their demotion into 
“partly free” democracies by Freedom House in 2006. In Indonesia, the power of 
oligarchic actors continue to loom large over the decision-making process. This paper 
seeks to look at this particular period in order to identify the variables that have led to 
the regression, halting, or deceleration of the democratization process.  
 
 
Methodology 
 
The following chapters seek to critically examine the continued applicability of the 
three approaches via these case studies: Indonesia, Thailand, and the Philippines. This 
thesis will adopt a qualitative and comparative-historical analysis to assess the internal 
validity of the arguments and to identify whether there are any shared patterns that 
strengthen or weaken the democratization process in the three countries. As mentioned 
previously, the three countries have been chosen based on similar experiences of 
                                                          
21 Freedom House. "Freedom in the World 2003". Freedom House, accessed 18 September 2014, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2003#.VE-37BbOsTI; Freedom 
House. "Freedom in the World 2010". Freedom House, accessed 18 September 2014, 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/freedom-world/freedom-world-2010#.VE-4JBbOsTI 
22 Acharya, Amitav. "Democratisation and the prospects for participatory regionalism in Southeast 
Asia". Third World Quartlerly 24:2 (2010): 375-376, doi: 10.1080/0143659032000074646 
15 
 
radical political liberalizations that have slowed down within the past decade. This 
shared trait of political transition will allow this paper to conduct a “controlled 
comparison”, which may point out key patterns that could further support this paper’s 
arguments. To narrow down the research scope, this paper will focus on the period 
between 2000 and 2010. This is a departure from traditional approaches to the study 
of democratic survival in the region, which has traditionally focused on the period of 
democratic transition. By looking at the troubled period from 2000 and 2010 and 
identifying key moments, this paper seeks to identify what factors have led to the 
deceleration, regression, or halting of the democratization process. 
 
The research will be carried out through a review and analysis of literatures that are 
associated with the three countries and timeframes from scholars who have written 
about democratic transitions and consolidations, Southeast Asian political culture, and 
socioeconomic development. Much of this literature will serve as secondary resources 
that are based on intensive researches on the three countries’ political systems. There 
will also be uses of surveys that have been compiled by the Asian Barometer, which 
conducts extensive researches on public opinion of democracy and politics in Asia. 
These surveys will be used to provide evidence for arguments relating to public 
support of democracy or authoritarianism. 
 
Thesis Structure 
 
The paper is divided into four chapters, with this introductory chapter being the first 
one. Apart from presenting the nitty gritty of the research methodology, this chapter 
has also provided a working definition of “democracy” that will be applied throughout 
the paper. The second chapter is a literature review of prominent research approaches 
to the topic of democratic survival. This chapter will look at the three approaches to 
the study of democratization in Southeast Asia – socioeconomic, structural, and 
cultural and ethnic – in order to critique the pre-existing literature on the topic. This 
chapter has two primary objectives. Firstly, it aims to ensure that this paper has 
achieved theoretical control by considering all important variables for the topic of 
democratic survival in Southeast Asia. Secondly, it seeks to identify room for 
expansion on the knowledge of these key variables. 
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Chapter 3 will be divided into two sections. The first section will provide a historical 
narrative of events from 2000 and 2010 that exhibit elements of variables that 
strengthen or weaken young democracies in each of the three case studies. The second 
section will provide an analysis on each of the three country case studies in order to 
identify the challenges to the democratization process in each of the three countries. 
The fourth chapter will provide a comparative analysis of the three countries and 
identify the shared variables that explain the outcome of their ongoing democratization 
processes. The last section of the paper will be the conclusion, which will summarize 
all findings and reflect on the wider implications its findings would have in the broader 
context of the literature of democratic survival in Southeast Asia. 
 
Limitations of Paper 
 
The difficulty of attempting to answer such a large and broad question lies in the highly 
complex diversity that shapes Southeast Asia’s polities. Scholars have proposed 
countless variables to describe the outcome and process of each democratization 
process in the region. However, due to this paper’s word limit, it will not be able to 
identify and assess the entire spectrum of these variables. Rather, this paper will assess 
the most prominent and common variables that have been suggested by scholars on 
the topic. Additionally, this paper will not be able to research the impacts of each 
variables in great detail. These are topics that can be addressed in future research 
projects. 
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2 
Challenges to Democratic Survival in Southeast Asia 
 
Given the volatile nature of Southeast Asia’s young democracies in recent years, 
scholars from all fields of studies within Southeast Asian political science have 
attempted to offer unique variables and approaches that try to explain the sudden 
regression or deceleration of the democratization process. This chapter seeks to look 
at six variables in the literature, which have been placed into three primary groups: 
socioeconomic, structural, and cultural and ethnic. These variables – lower levels of 
modernization, income inequality, weak political parties, political influence of the 
military, Asian values, and ethnic and cultural fragmentation – have been chosen 
because they have generated some of the most dominant debates within the study of 
democracy studies, particularly within the study of Southeast Asian democracy, which 
has been seen as an anomaly by scholars for its unique ability to juggle 
authoritarianism and modest or good standards of living. By understanding the root 
causes of the arguments for and against these variables, we will gain a better 
understanding of how democracy in Southeast Asia has been perceived to operate from 
an interdisciplinary perspective. 
  
Socioeconomic Variables 
 
The socioeconomic approach is the dominant approach amongst scholars of 
democracy studies, having been prominent since Aristotle. It is concerned with the 
impact of economic performance and stability on societal behaviour towards the 
regime.23 There are two key socioeconomic variables that threaten democratic 
institutions, which this paper will investigate: lower levels of modernization24 and 
                                                          
23 Diskin, Abraham et al. "Why Democracies Collapse: The Reasons for Democratic Failure and 
Success". International Political Science Review 26:3 (2005): 293-294. 
doi:10.1177/0192512105053787  
24 The “modernization theory” refers to a theory that explains the process of modernization within 
societies. When applied to studies of democracy, it refers to the causal nexus between socioeconomic 
development and democracy. Within the study of democratic survival, it is concerned with how social 
factors that result from economic development (e.g. improved living standards and education) effect 
the democratization process. “Lower levels of modernization” refer to a society with a poor and 
developing economy. Przeworski and Limongi provide a good discussion on the nexus between the 
modernization theory and democracy and democratic survival: Przeworski & Limongi. "Modernization: 
Theories and Facts". 
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income inequality. Income inequality and lower levels of modernization are not 
mutually exclusive. As Acemolgu et al. argue, income inequality is a by-product of 
modernization.25 However, income inequality should be considered an independent 
variable in its own right, as average levels of modernization are not pre-requisites of 
widening income gaps, as seen in Thailand.26 Additionally, income inequality poses 
unique social and political risks to society, such as the deepening of social cleavages, 
as this section will later explain.  
 
Lower levels of modernization 
 
Within the study of democracy, scholars have long argued that good economic 
performance and stability provide legitimacy to the regime. Lipset argues that 
continuous economic development would provide the regime sufficient legitimacy, 
which is necessary for regime survival. Basing his work on cross-national and cross-
sectional data, he builds up this argument by suggesting that economic development 
creates a series of fundamental social changes – primarily advances in urbanization, 
education, and industrialization – that may produce and enhance democratic 
institutions.27 This assumption, while highly debated amongst scholars, has numerous 
academic proponents. Przeworski et al. have come to similar conclusions as Lipset by 
arguing that ‘once a country has a democratic regime, its level of economic 
development has a very strong effect on the probability that democracy will survive’.28 
However, they also added that affluence (or at least a GDP per capita of $6,055, also 
known as the “Argentina threshold”) contributes to the likelihood of stability in young 
                                                          
25 Acemoglu, Daron et al. "Democracy, Redistribution and Inequality" (working paper, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, 2013), http://www.nber.org/papers/w19746 
26 The GINI Index has measured their income inequality levels to be at 43 and 37.8, respectively (0 
representing perfect equality and 100 perfect inequality). They rank as the 52nd and 70th most unequal 
countries in the world. See: "GINI Index", World Bank, accessed 10 October 2014. 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SI.POV.GINI 
27 Lipset, Seymour Martin. “Some Social Requisites of Democracy”, 75-85 
28 Przeworski, Adam et al. "What makes democracies endure?". Journal of Democracy 7:1 (1996): 40-
41 
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democracies.29 This is because increased wealth greatly lowers the distributional 
conflicts within society ‘through various sociological mechanisms’.30 
 
There is difficulty in testing Przeworski et al.’s criteria in Southeast Asia’s young 
democracies. Democratic institutions in Indonesia and the Philippines, which fail to 
reach the Argentina threshold, seem to face continuing threats from powerful actors 
from past authoritarian governments. However, democratic institutions in Singapore 
and Malaysia, which pass the Argentina threshold, equally face numerous pressures. 
While, some scholars of Southeast Asian politics are likely to disagree with their 
criteria, many would likely agree on their overall assessment that economic 
performance is likely to ensure, or at least significantly contribute to, regime stability. 
For instance, Alagappa argues that the durability of one-party systems and resilient 
authoritarian regimes, plus the added economic success of such regimes in East and 
Southeast Asia seem to refute the central assumptions of the dominant development 
approach.31 Indeed, good economic performance has provided legitimacy to regimes, 
regardless of regime type. For instance, Case has observed that the ability of the United 
Malays National Organization (UMNO) to operate a stable “semi-democratic” regime 
without the use of force lies in the economic and infrastructural development it has 
provided the Malaysian people, granting them considerable political legitimacy 
amongst the mass population.32 Similarly, the authoritarian Suharto government rested 
its legitimacy on ‘the twin pillars of economic development and political stability, both 
of which have helped ensure the survival of the nation’.33 The Suharto government 
was only forced out of power following the 1997-98 Asian Financial Crisis, which 
devastated the Indonesian economy. 
                                                          
29 Przeworski et al. have reached this conclusion in a 1996 paper after analysing all democracies from 
1876 until 1996. They conclude that democracies with a per capita income of under $2,000 has an 
expected life of nine years. Countries with per capita incomes between $2,001 and $6,000 have an 
expected life of 20 years. They found that wealthy democracies, or those above $6,055, have never 
failed, even in times of economic crisis. See: Ibid, 41-42 
30 Przeworski, Adam et al. Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and Material Well-being 
in the World, 1950-1990. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 101 
31 Alagappa, Muthiah. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority. 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), 5 
32 Case, William. “Malaysia: Aspects and Audiences of Legitimacy" in Political Legitimacy in 
Southeast Asia: The Quest for Moral Authority. ed. Alagappa, Muthiah. (Stanford: Stanford University 
Press, 1995) 70-72 
33 Rock, Michael T. "The Politics of Development Policy and Development Policy Reform in New Order 
Indonesia" (Working Paper, William Davidson Institute, 2003) 
http://wdi.umich.edu/files/publications/workingpapers/wp632.pdf 
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Scholars on Southeast Asian politics have traditionally observed that ensuring stable 
economic performance was paramount for all authoritarian regimes in the region, as 
failure to do so would mean losing legitimacy. However, there is also concern amongst 
scholars that young democracies face similar challenges. Croissant and Bunte observe 
that ‘the bourgeoisie and the middle classes have supported their own political 
inclusion, but at the same time, have favoured political stability, economic 
development, and secure property rights...’.34 Statistical evidence from the Asian 
Barometer seems to support Croissant and Bunte’s argument. For instance, in 
Thailand, 49% of respondents argue that economic development is either much more 
or somewhat more important than democracy.35 Indeed, the statistical evidences seem 
to suggest that many Southeast Asians seem to favour economic stability over 
democracy, and many scholars of Southeast Asian politics seem to agree that lower 
levels of modernization would harm the legitimacy of democratic institutions. 
However, there are scholars who criticize the application of the modernization theory 
on Southeast Asia’s young democracies. For instance, in an analysis of a number of 
East and Southeast Asian countries, Thompson concludes that the preservation of 
democratic institutions have little to do with modernization, but rather by a weak state 
that is incapable of providing effective governance and cater to the economic interests 
of the middle class.36 Similarly, Lee and Buckley argues that the level of 
modernization may not play as large a role as other variables on the democratization 
process. He also adds that lower levels of modernization in the Philippines and Timor-
Leste have not prevented the continued survival of democratic institutions.37 
 
While Thompson’s argument has some validity, as structural factors are very 
important variables, Lee and Buckley’s assessment is not entirely accurate. As some 
                                                          
34 Croissant, Aurel & Bunte, Marco. "Democracy in Southeast Asia - An Assessment of Practices, 
Problems, and Prospects". in A Future for Democracy, ed. Hofmeister, Wilhelm (Singapore: Konrad-
Adenauer-Stiftung, 2011) 20  
35 Albritton, Robert B. "Support for Democracy in Thailand". (Working Paper, Asian Barometer, 2002). 
http://www.asianbarometer.org/newenglish/publications/workingpapers/no.3.pdf 
36 Thompson, Mark R. "Modernization theory's last redoubt". in East Asia's New Democracies: 
Deepening, reversal, non-liberal alternatives, ed. Chu, Yin-wah and Wong, Siu-Iun. (New York: 
Routledge, 2010) 89-96 
37 Lee, Yoke-Lian and Buckley, Roger. "Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Decolonization, Modernization, 
Nationalism, and State-Building". in Politics of Conflict: A Survey, ed. Fouskas, Vassilis (London: 
Routledge, 2007), 104-110 
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scholars argue, past experiences at democratization have been reversed or completely 
destroyed by lower levels of modernization. For instance, Robinson observed that 
political and economic instability during the liberal democracy period and the 
successive Guided Democracy period in Indonesia shifted public support towards 
authoritarianism, which was perceived more stable.38 Similarly, Funatso and Kagoya 
observed that public support for democracy in 1976 Thailand was quick to switch back 
to support for military rule when the new democratic government failed to effectively 
deal with poor economic growth and deal with growing Marxist threats. Thus, the 
public ‘tacitly expected that the military would regain control, restoring political 
stability and protecting their economic interests’.39 There seems to be some agreement 
amongst many scholars that while members of society found key democratic 
institutions, such as freedom of speech and political mobilization, to be appealing, 
many favoured a state that was capable of ensuring law and order.40 Thus, poor 
economic performance or an unstable economy continue to be an important 
contributing variable in studies of democracy 
 
Income Inequality 
 
There is a strong consensus amongst scholars that extreme forms of socioeconomic 
inequality create social issues that undermine democracy.41 Acemolgu and Robinson 
have observed that extreme forms of inequality create the foundation for conditions 
that provoke popular pressure for self-redistribution, as well as the elite resistance to 
them.42 However, such an issue remains a puzzle within academia. Scholars argue that 
a democratic regime is more likely to narrow the gap between the rich and poor, as the 
                                                          
38 Robinson, Richard. “The middle class and the bourgeoisie in Indonesia”. in The New Rich in Asia: 
Mobile phones, McDonald’s and the middle-class revolution, ed. Goodman, David & Robinson, 
Richard (London: Routledge, 2013) 82-83 
39 Funatsu, Tsuruyo & Kagoya, Kazuhiro. "The Middle Classes in Thailand: The Rise of the Urban 
Intellectual Elite and their Social Consciousness". The Developing Economies, XLI:2 (2003): 246 
40 See Croissant and Bunte op cit.; Lee & Roger, “Conflicts in Southeast Asia: Decolonization, 
Modernization, Nationalism, and State-Building”; Robinson, “The middle class and the bourgeoisie in 
Indonesia”; Thompson “Modernization Theory’s Last Redoubt”; Yong, Mun Cheong. “Political 
structures”, in The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, ed. Tarling, Nicholas. (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1992). 
41 See Perotti, Roberto. "Growth, income distribution, and democracy: what the data say". Journal of 
Economic Growth 1:2 (1996): 149-187; Boix, Carles & Posner, Daniel N. "Social Capital: Explaining 
its origins and effects on government performance". British Journal of Political Science 1:4 (1998): 
686-693 
42 Acemolgu et al. “Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality”. 
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median voter will use their democratic power to redistribute resources away from the 
rich.43 Additionally, democratic governments are accountable to a country’s entire 
population, rather than to a powerful and rich minority.44 Nonetheless, income 
disparity continues to be an issue in even developed democracies, such as the United 
States.45 The problem is more endemic in nascent democracies, such as Thailand and 
the Philippines, as past authoritarian regimes have often concentrated economic 
development within particular areas.  
 
The social and political implications of income inequality on democracy are 
numerous, such as less social cohesion and increasing crime rates. But within scholarly 
discussions of income inequality in Southeast Asia, there seems to be a lot of attention 
given to its role in deepening the political divide between urban and rural populations. 
In a 1970 paper, Stigler argues that democracy only primarily aims to transfer political 
power to the middle class, rather than the masses. In an analysis of public revenue 
distribution in the United States, Stigler concludes that democracies provide greater 
political and economic autonomies and benefits to the middle class, which may not 
necessarily benefit the lower class. These benefits include lower taxes, increased 
spending for urban infrastructure, and restricting minimum wage. Such policies 
benefit the middle class, but have negative implications on the lower class. Stigler 
concludes that the political power to shift redistribution to benefit the lower class truly 
lies with the middle class. However, the widening income gap in the United States and 
the ongoing division within the middle class over support for redistribution policies 
continue to hamper the political relationship between the classes.46 
 
Some Southeast Asian scholars possess similar observations as Stigler. In a 
comparative research on Asia, Bunnell et al. have noted that the concentration of 
wealth in urban areas have created an urban-rural divide, which has deepened social 
cleavages in young democracies. They observe that the divide is largely caused by 
ideological reasons, as rural dwellers are seen by their urban counterparts as ‘subject 
                                                          
43 Meltzer, Allan H. & Richard, Scott F. "A Rational Theory of the Size of Government" The Journal 
of Political Economy 89:5 (1981): 914-927; Boix & Posner. “Social Capital: Explaining its origins and 
effects on government performance”. 
44 Boix and Posner, Ibid, 690-692  
45 Acemolgu and Robinson, “Democracy, Redistribution, and Inequality”. 
46 Stigler, George J. "Director's Law of Public Income Redistribution". Journal of Law and Economics 
13:1 (1970): 1-4. http://www.jstor.org/stable/pdfplus/724835.pdf?&acceptTC=true&jpdConfirm=true 
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of scorn, ridicule, and debasement’, which in turn make them ‘ready-at-hand for 
political mobilization’.47 Thus, political entrepreneurs in young democracies, such as 
Thailand’s Thaksin Shinawatra, have managed to take advantage of this divide to 
mobilize support, by promising to redistribute resources to the poor, while attempting 
to strengthen their own political power through material means.48 In a general 
observation on the political implications of inequality, Lupu and Pontusson argue that 
the chances of social cleavages heighten in more ethnically heterogeneous societies, 
leading to the emergence of ethnic-based parties that may possess demagogue 
characteristics.49 This, in turn, may heighten the possibility of ethnic conflict. Indeed, 
experiences from Southeast Asia seem to suggest that the region’s young democracies 
continue to struggle within the effects of deepening social cleavages. 
 
Scholars have long asserted that economic woes, such as income inequality and a 
malfunctioning economy, have the potential to pose devastating political 
consequences for democratic survival. Thus, the effectiveness of political actors are 
tested as they are tasked to ensure that the social and political effects of economic 
woes do not threaten democracy’s key institutions. This leads to the discussion on the 
next two variables. 
 
Structural Variables 
 
Within the study of democratization in Southeast Asia, there has been considerable 
attention given to the structural foundations of young democracies. Proponents of the 
structural variables are interested in how the political system and democratic transition 
process are structured by actors, such as the military, political parties, and members 
of past authoritarian elites. As Slater argues, the basis of the structural approach 
primarily rests on scholarly interests in unravelling why authoritarianism in the region 
                                                          
47 Bunnell, Tim et al. Cleavage, Connection, and Conflict in Rural, Urban, and Contemporary Asia 
(Singapore: Springer, 2013), 174-177. 
48 Ibid. 177  
49 “Demagogue characteristics” is defined by an effective rhetoric for a political agenda. In this case, 
demagogues may take advantage of historical animosity amongst ethnicities or income inequality to 
blame a particular ethnic group for economic woes. Lupu, Noam & Pontusson, Jonas. "The Structure 
of Inequality and the Politics of Redistribution". American Political Science Review 105:2 (2011): 317-
319. doi:10.1017/S0003055411000128 
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endures, whereas others are prone to collapse.50 By focusing on key actors, this 
approach ‘steers a middle path between the apolitical determinism of the “social pre-
requisites” literature and the asocial and ahistorical contingency of the “transitology” 
literature’.51 Scholars of the region have rarely ignored the structural foundations of 
authoritarian durability in the study of democratization dynamics. As such, there is a 
rich variety of literature focusing on the role of political parties, militaries, and even 
class structures and their impact on the democratization process. However, two 
structural variables that threaten democratic institutions seem to emerge as the 
dominant ones in the study of democratization in Southeast Asia: the dominance of 
weak political parties and the continuing political influence of the military. While the 
political implications of both variables are different, the cause of its manifestation are 
similar, as will be explained later on in this section. 
 
Following Fukuyama’s declaration of victory for liberal democracies, numerous 
scholarly papers have emerged warning of the so-called “fallacy of electoralism”. 
Scholars responded to Fukuyama’s declaration by adding adjectives to the democratic 
systems of the Third wave, such as “illiberal”, “defective”, and “ambiguous”, among 
others.52 Huntington argues that young democracies may face a “democracy paradox”, 
in which elections facilitate the emergence of groups that appeal to religious or ethnic 
loyalties and are likely to be ‘anti-democratic’.53 Such an issue is relevant to Southeast 
Asia, considering its ethnic diversity, and has encouraged more research on the effects 
of the “democracy paradox” in Southeast Asia. However, while Huntington's work 
was influential, it failed to address why “Third Wave” democracies would behave in 
this way. In a prominent 1997 paper, Zakaria attempted to address this question by 
                                                          
50 Slater, "Democracies and Dictatorships Do Not Float Freely: Structural Sources of Political Regimes 
in Southeast Asia", 9. 
51 Ibid, 31. The “social pre-requisites literature” refers to the body of literature that looks at the role of 
modernization and socioeconomic development on democracy. Prominent literature: Lipset, 
Przeworski et al. (will be referenced with other papers above). On the other hand, proponents of 
transitology argue that there are no set of pre-conditions that are necessary for democracy to take root. 
Rather, the primary causal variable for democratic survival during transition is elite bargaining. 
Guillermo O'Donnell is a prominent pioneer of the transitology literature. O'Donnell, Guillermo. 
Transitions from authoritarian rule: Tentative conclusions about uncertain democracies (Baltimore: 
John Hopkins University Press, 2013) 
52 Zakaria, Fareed. "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy". Foreign Affairs 76:6 (1997) 22-43. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/53577/fareed-zakaria/the-rise-of-illiberal-democracy; Merkel, 
Wolfgang. "Embedded and Defective Democracies". Democratization 11:5 (2004): 33-58. 
DOI:10.1080=13510340412331304598; Diamond, Larry. "Elections without Democracy: Thinking 
about Hybrid Regimes". Journal of Democracy 13:2 (2002): 21-35. 
53 Huntington, Samuel. "Democracy for the Long Haul". Journal of Democracy 7:2 (1996): 6-7  
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arguing that in order for a young democracy to consolidate, it must undergo 
considerable political liberalization prior to the period of democratization. Otherwise, 
it will lead to an “illiberal democracy”. In such a system, a government that is elected 
through popular and (sometimes) competitive elections, may suspend or limit the civil 
and political liberties of its people, while creating a power base with a particular group 
(e.g. largest ethnic group, rural poor). Zakaria’s assumption stems from the idea that 
newly-elected democratic leaders will be pressured to modernize the economy and 
liberalize a political system amidst the political threats of opponents, thus weakening 
all forms of opposition to rule without possible expulsion from power.54 
 
Huntington’s and Zakaria’s concerns were confirmed by Diamond in a 2008 article, 
when Diamond reported that democracy in many parts of the world, including 
Southeast Asia, has become a “superficial phenomenon” that regularly witnesses acts 
of bad governance, such as a corrupt legal system, abusive security forces, and the 
political dominance of local oligarchs. Elections, Diamond concludes, are then just 
‘contests between corrupt, clientelistic parties’.55 There has been significant empirical 
research conducted on Southeast Asia that seem to reinforce that the concerns raised 
by Huntington, Zakaria, and Diamond are not unfounded. Many observers argue that 
while young democracies provide greater political and civil liberties to its people, it 
continues to be hampered by corruption, the political dominance of oligarchs, and 
public disillusionment over the democratic government’s ability to fulfil promises.56 
Schedler has observed that the region’s electoral autocracies have practiced ‘the 
containment of liberal participation while tolerating electoral contestation, which has 
resulted in a desultory mix of freedoms and controls’.57 Thus, some scholars observe 
that for many Southeast Asians, democracy equates to ‘little more than elections’.58 
Some scholars have referred to the role of structural actors as to blame for these 
problems. 
 
 
                                                          
54 Zakaria, “The Rise of Illiberal Democracy”, 35-36 
55 Diamond, Larry. "The Democratic Rollback". Foreign Affairs, 2008, accessed 13 October 2014. 
http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/63218/larry-diamond/the-democratic-rollback 
56 Kurlantzick, “Southeast Asia's Regression From Democracy and Its Implications”, 16-17 
57 Schedler, Andreas. "Elections without Democracy: The Menu of Manipulation". Journal of 
Democracy 13:2 (2002): 43 
58 Kurlantzick, “Southeast Asia's Regression From Democracy and Its Implications”, 13 
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Weak Political Parties 
 
Much of the literature that focuses on the influence of the “authoritarian past” on the 
democratization process tends to argue that the role and influence of political parties 
during the period of authoritarian rule play a very important part in shaping the 
democratization process, as it determines the strength of opposition parties and the 
party loyalty. A number of scholars argue that strong, well-institutionalized, and well-
rooted political parties are necessary requirements for the consolidation of a 
democracy, as it facilitates stable and well-institutionalized party systems that are 
moderately polarized and are capable of promoting the efficiency and effectiveness of 
democratic institutions. Thereby, they contribute to the legitimacy and functioning of 
the democratic system at large.59 However, in Southeast Asia, only Singapore, 
Malaysia, Vietnam, and Laos contain strong political parties. The rest of the region 
struggles to possess strong political parties, due to weak and highly fragmented 
opposition parties and the prevalence of money politics. 
 
Party cohesiveness is a fundamental component of regime survival. Crouch and 
Morley observe how strong networks and patronage ties within the People’s Action 
Party (PAP) and New Order elite in Singapore and Indonesia, respectively, have been 
fundamental reasons for the preservation of the authoritarian regime’s power. They 
argue that ‘a long-established cohesive elite can often obstruct political change even 
when other factors are pushing the direction of change’.60 On the other hand, ‘the less 
cohesive an elite, the less it is able to resist pressures toward liberalization and 
democratization’.61 The latter is a pre-condition for a democratic transition, as a less 
cohesive elite would be prone to external attacks from other elites, the public, or 
foreign powers. However, the failure of party cohesiveness also signals the failure of 
the government to manage elite relationships and quash dissent. 
 
                                                          
59 Blondel, Jean et al. “Economic development v. political democracy’ in Democracy, Governance, and 
Economic Performance: East and Southeast Asia (New York: United Nations University Press, 1999); 
Bosco, Anna et al. Party Change in Southern Europe (London: Routledge, 2006); Diamond, Larry & 
Gunther, Richard. Political Parties and Democracy (Baltimore: John Hopkins University Press, 2001). 
60 Crouch & Morley "The Dynamics of Political Change", 277 
61 Ibid. 278  
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The result of weak party structures can pose a serious threat to democratic stability 
and credibility. Firstly, weak political parties are often transient and fail to develop 
close links with voters. Croissant and Volker argue that this poses a threat to the public 
credibility of the party system, as parties “disappear like soap bubbles” and fail to 
accommodate the demands of electorates.62 Party inchoateness also creates a vacuum 
that would allow populists and oligarchs to come into power and dominate the political 
arena. In a study on Indonesia, Winters observes that the collapse of the Suharto 
regime saw the rise of oligarchs, many of whom materially benefited under Suharto, 
vying to either protect or increase political and financial power. Oligarchs and 
members of the past authoritarian elite recognize new challenges posed by 
democratization to their political power and use the advantage of material wealth to 
protect themselves from these new challenges.63 Observers have noted that oligarchs 
and other powerful “informal” actors have utilized party connections and their vast 
financial resources to bypass laws and decrease political or financial competition from 
non-oligarchs. For instance, Hamilton-Hart observes how in Thailand and the 
Philippines, members of oligarchic or well-connected families were able to bypass 
normal entry channels and secure high-ranking positions within the bureaucracy.64 
Such examples lead to the second danger of weak political parties, which is the 
ineffectiveness of governance. 
 
A number of scholars argue that high levels of corruption is a prominent cause of bad 
governance.65 Corruption prevents public institutions from performing their functions, 
creates lack of trust in authorities, and hampers efforts at economic and infrastructural 
development. However, corruption remains an endemic political and economic 
problem in most Southeast Asian countries and even countries with strong political 
parties, such as Malaysia and Vietnam, continue to face considerable problems from 
corruption. However, democracies with weaker political parties are shown to struggle 
                                                          
62 Croissant and Bunte, “Democracy in Southeast Asia - An Assessment of Practices, Problems, and 
Prospects”, 23 
63 Winters. “Oligarchy and Democracy in Indonesia”, 15-20 
64 Hamilton-Hart, Natasha. Hard Interests, Soft Illusions: Southeast Asia and American Power (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 2012) 178-179 
65 Kaminski, Antoni & Kaminski, Bartlomiej. "Governance and Corruption in Transition: The 
Challenge of Subverting Corruption". (Working Paper, United Nations Economic Commission Europe, 
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more in combatting corruption, as well as other political issues, such as nepotism and 
graft. Aceron notes that weak political parties, particularly those in opposition, have 
less power to review and contest government action and policies. Consequently, this 
prevents the emergence of coherent structures and institutions of accountability and 
review.66 Additionally, as weak political parties are often patrimonialistic and based 
around patron-client relations, politicians are sometimes encouraged to pursue forms 
of “money politics” in order to secure political positions and votes.67 These actions 
create a political culture in which corruption is tolerated. Thus, influencing the 
behaviour of state and government officials.  
 
By failing to provide effective governance, the government, as Kurlantzick argues, 
generates disillusionment amidst the middle class, in particular – a collectivist that has 
typically driven the democratization movement with high hopes that democracy and 
greater political liberalism will effectively deal with aspects of the authoritarian past, 
such as corruption, nepotism, and abusive security forces.68 Some Southeast Asia 
scholars have warned that this will encourage citizens to take matters into their own 
hands. While this may strengthen the role of CSOs within society, it may also lead to 
extra-constitutional or extra-judicial acts. For instance, dissatisfaction with major 
corruption scandals led to massive public protests that led to the 2001 removal of 
Joseph Estrada through extra-constitutional means in the Philippines. This act greatly 
undermined the electoral process through which he was elected into power.69 
 
Political influence of the military 
 
The political influence of the military throughout most of Southeast Asia continues to 
remain a threat to democratic institutions. Huntington was a prominent pioneer in the 
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dynamics, ed. Aceron, Joy. (Bonn: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2009) 5-6 
67 Quimpo, Nathan. "The Philippines: Political Parties and Corruption". Southeast Asian Affairs (2007): 
282-286 
68 Kurlantzick, Joshua. "Southeast Asia's Regression From Democracy and Its Implications". (Working 
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study of civil-military relations within young democracies. He argues that a key 
precursor to a consolidated democracy is “objective civilian control” of the military 
and the complete removal of the military from politics.70 The failure to do so could 
warrant a complicated civil-military relationship during the period of democratic 
consolidation, as civilians would grow to dislike the political and economic privileges 
that military officers have. With the exception of Malaysia, Singapore, and Brunei, the 
role of the military as a professional armed force in Southeast Asia has been expanded 
to include political and economic duties as well. For instance, under the leadership of 
Suharto, Marcos, and the successive military governments in pre-1992 Thailand, the 
military was given special political and economic roles in order to strengthen the 
power base of the autocrat. This included providing officers with leadership over 
lucrative state-owned enterprises. Scholars argue that by possessing additional roles, 
the military adopted a strong political identity that may not only undermine civilian 
democratic rule, but also create divisions between the professional and political 
factions of the military.71 These two factors pose a direct threat to democratic 
institutions. Thus, scholars argue that it is imperative that young democracies should 
gradually remove military actors from politics, so that they do not harm the very 
delicate civil-military relationship. 
 
The two aforementioned variables can be interconnected. Some experiences in 
Southeast Asia suggest that the relationship between political party actors and the 
military play a very important role in the consolidation process. But, as Huntington 
argues, the threat to democracy does not necessarily arise out of the military’s political 
role, but rather from the civilian actions towards it.72 Wollack argues that the lack of 
unifying principles and well-institutionalized rules and procedures, as well as an 
unwillingness to undertake greater citizen outreach and consultation have eroded 
public support and discouraged many from participating in political party activities. 
This has further isolated political parties from the people.73 Instead, much political 
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campaigning in many parts of Southeast Asia focuses on candidates over political 
parties. Weak party systems have led to the rise of new and populist figures within the 
political arena, who have used their significant material wealth to come to power, 
appeal to the rural poor, and upset the established elite, including the military. In some 
of the region’s young democracies, this has posed considerable problems to civil-
military relations and have led to frequent attempts by factions of the military to 
interfere in politics. 
 
The authoritarian behaviour that structural actors in young democracies possess relate 
to an argument by Linz and Stepan in 1996, who argue that in order for democracy to 
consolidate, there must also be “behavioural consolidation”. Linz and Stepan argue 
that for this to occur, ‘no significant national, social, economic, political, or 
institutional actors spend significant resources attempting to achieve their objectives 
by creating a nondemocratic regime or by seceding from the state’.74 Such actors 
include the military and oligarchic figures. There must be acceptance from these actors 
that legitimate political power lies within the state. This relates to the next set of 
variables. 
 
Cultural and Ethnic Variables 
 
The cultural and ethnic approach to the study of democracy in Southeast Asia focuses 
on the role of political culture, ideologies, religion, and values in shaping public and 
state perceptions of democracy. There are two dominant variables within this 
approach: Asian values and ethnic and cultural fragmentation. Both variables have 
received considerable attention within the literature, as scholars attempt to identify 
what factors drive factions within society to either support or reject democratic values. 
Proponents of this approach argue that Southeast Asian democracies face unique 
struggles, as cultural differences and different cultural perceptions over the role of the 
state within society create the implementation of democratic institutions – with 
political liberal values – complicated and prone to clash with conservative or 
traditional views. 
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Asian Values 
 
The first variable is Asian values, a controversial concept that was popularized in the 
1980s and 1990s by Singaporean Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew and Malaysian Prime 
Minister Mahathir Mohammad. During the 1980s and 1990s, scholars and 
policymakers alike were intrigued by the significant pace of economic growth in East 
and Southeast Asia, which saw the emergence of some of the most prosperous 
countries in the developing world, despite being governed by authoritarian or semi-
authoritarian governments. This argument involves the notion that there are elements 
of Asian political and social culture, which would not go hand-in-hand with Western 
political liberalism. Rohwer provides a good summary of what he believes outlines 
the origins of the “Asian values”:75 
 
‘The need for self-sufficiency has been the greatest single spur 
to the creation, and retention, of what have come to be called 
“Asian Values”: the family rather than the individual as the 
paramount unit of society; a preference for order over freedom 
and the common good over individual fulfilment; hence, 
considerable deference to authority; frugality; and a belief in 
the virtues of education and hard work’. 
 
A critically important, but perhaps contentious, component of Rohwer’s quote is his 
reference to a willingness to defer to authority and a preference for order. Numerous 
scholars have pointed out how Asian political culture is defined by a respect for 
authority and order, over individualistic values, such as human rights. Pye and Pye 
argue that certain social values may produce an allegiance with authority, which makes 
it incompatible with democratic norms.76 Dalton and Ong point out how Southeast 
Asian societies tend to be paternalistic, community-oriented, duty-based, and more 
inclined to support consensus over majority-voting as it is perceived to protect 
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harmony.77 Similarly, Scalapino argues that the great emphasis on communalism and 
consensus would mean that there is little tolerance for opposition groups.78 
 
The concept is highly debated within academia as its critics argue that it is 
methodologically dubious and dependent on the crudest of generalizations. Sen is a 
key critic of the Asian values and argues that ‘to see Asian history in terms of a narrow 
category of authoritarian values does little justice to the rich varieties of thought in 
Asian intellectual traditions. Dubious history does nothing to vindicate dubious 
politics’.79 In a prominent 1994 rebuttal to Lee Kuan Yew’s “Culture is Destiny” 
interview with Fareed Zakaria, future South Korean President Kim Dae-jung attacked 
the notion that East and Southeast Asian societies are more susceptible to 
authoritarianism, arguing that the inevitable consequence of industrialization is that 
societies are moving towards “self-centred individualism”.80 Dalton and Ong made a 
similar argument, stating that social modernization in the region has brought in great 
generational shifts away from authority orientations.81 Kim, Dalton, and Ong’s 
statements are reminiscent of the modernization theory, which indicates that an 
expanding middle class would demand greater political and economic autonomy. 
While, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, scholars have observed that many 
Southeast Asians would prefer economic stability over democracy, a series of Asian 
Barometer surveys have shown that Southeast Asians are increasingly supportive of 
democracy. For instance, the Asian Barometer reports that 86.4% of the population in 
Indonesia, 83.7% in Thailand, and 85% in Singapore support government 
implementations of democratic institutions, such as freedom of speech and free and 
fair elections.82 Such statistical evidence put to question the validity of the Asian 
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values argument, as it seems that democratic institutions are gaining more support 
from a more modernized and globalized society. 
 
The “Asian values” argument lost much of its weight following the 1997-98 Asian 
Financial Crisis, as many blamed the corrupt and paternalistic nature of the Asian 
values political culture that contributed to the crisis.83 Additionally, numerous sets of 
statistical and empirical evidence have indicated that Asian values are no longer 
supported by the very societies that were said to embrace them. Indeed, the Asian 
values, with its emphasis on communitarianism and paternalistic-rule, is largely a 
justification for patron-client relations, subservience to governmental authority, and a 
means to justify government actions to preserve political stability. However, this is 
not to say that the Asian values argument should be completely discarded. Indeed, 
there is no empirical evidence that Southeast Asians are generally more hardworking 
or subservient to authority. However, the acceptance of communitarianism and 
paternalistic rule within government circles have left a long-lasting impact that shapes 
the behaviours and structures of how state institutions, the military, and political 
parties operate. Acceptance of such a political culture may partly explain the 
prevalence of personalistic parties that surround certain individuals in the period of 
democratization, such as UMNO in Malaysia and Golkar in Indonesia. A 
communitarian political culture also results in some unwanted consequences. For 
instance, the emergence of ethnic-based parties in Southeast Asia, which surround 
communitarian values and based on ethnic ties, play an important role in shaping inter-
ethnic relations. This relates to the second variable below. 
 
Ethnic and Cultural Fragmentation 
 
Traditionally, many scholars have believed that ethnic and cultural fragmentation pose 
detrimental threats to democratic survival. A relatively homogenous society was often 
assumed to be an important pre-condition to a democratic society. For instance, John 
Stuart Mill argues that democracy was incompatible with ethnically fragmented 
societies, as ‘free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different 
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nationalities’.84 Scholars since Mill’s time continue to uphold this assumption and 
during the post-colonial era, many have pointed to the failure of democratic 
institutions as having caused ethnic fragmentation.85 Dahl argues that while 
democracy in ethnically fragmented countries was possible, ‘pluralism often laces a 
dangerous strain on the tolerance and mutual security required for a system of public 
contestation’, and thus, ‘a competitive political system is less likely in countries with 
a considerable measure of subcultural pluralism’.86 In a prominent 1982 paper, Powell 
seemed to confirm this argument, after conducting a comprehensive cross-national 
study of 29 democracies. He concluded that there was a strong correlation between 
ethnic fractionalization and political instability, with the most multi-ethnic countries 
possessing higher levels of political instability.87 Since then, empirical and statistical 
researches on the correlation between ethnic fragmentation and democracy have 
continuously found that countries that are more multi-ethnic are less likely to have 
robust democracies.88 
 
Some scholars of Southeast Asian politics have also observed that ethnic heterogeneity 
increases the likelihood of democratic regression. Rabushka and Shepsle observe that 
political entrepreneurs would campaign based on ethnic lines, as they find that 
“outbidding” on ethnic issues (i.e. campaigning based on extremist rhetoric and policy 
positions) would increase their chances of winning votes.89 Cederman et al. also 
observe that ethnic nationalism and communal violence in the region have particularly 
escalated in some young democracies, such as Indonesia, as political figures 
orchestrate attacks or demagogic rhetoric to gain votes.90 Additionally, as previously 
mentioned in this chapter, political entrepreneurs have taken advantage of income 
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inequality and ethnic or religious differences for political gains. The power of deciding 
the equality of ethnicities lies with the people in a democracy, rather than the state 
under an authoritarian government. Enhanced civil and political liberties in 
democracies, which includes freedom of expression, have created greater ethnic, 
religious, and cultural tensions. This may have serious political and security 
implications, which can threaten the democratic regime. This will be investigated 
further in the three case studies of the next chapter. 
 
Proponents of the two aforementioned variables argue that in order for democracies to 
consolidate and prevent regression, there has to be acceptance from the state and 
society. State institutions, including those without formal political power, must be 
willing to accept their limited influence over the decision-making process. 
Additionally, ethnic groups must be willing to cooperate in order to prevent 
problematic ethnic ties that could lead to conflict and the emergence of demagogic 
figures. The transition from authoritarianism to a democracy is not one that is smooth. 
As the cultural, ethnic, and structural variables have explained, young democracies 
face numerous obstacles that are inherited from past authoritarian regimes that harm 
new democratic institutions, such as freedom of expression. Nonetheless, empirical 
and statistical evidence from Southeast Asia have shown that while cultural and ethnic 
issues over democratic institutions remain, there is wide public support for democracy. 
 
Chapter Conclusion 
 
The study of democratic survival in Southeast Asia is one that is multi-faceted and 
influenced by a series of political, socioeconomic, and cultural factors. The ability of 
a young democratic government to maintain legitimacy from its people is dependent 
on a series of factors that determine its ability to maintain economic and political 
stability, as well as ensure stable levels of governance. Indeed, there is no single 
variable that has contributed to the struggles that the region’s young democracies have 
faced. However, few of the above variables seem to be applicable to the entire region. 
The next chapter will look at the young democracies of Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand from 2000 until 2010 to identify if there are any common variables that have 
threatened the democratic institutions of Southeast Asia. 
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3 
Threats to Democratic Survival in Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand 
 
There is no single pathway to democratization. The analysis of the experiences of 
Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand in this chapter will demonstrate how different 
variables have uniquely shaped the democratization process. As mentioned in Chapter 
1, these three countries have been chosen because at one point in their respective recent 
histories, the process of its political liberalization has gone so well that they have been 
identified as an important example of how a burgeoning democracy can grow within 
a region that has long been dominated by authoritarian regimes. However, the position 
of each of the three countries along a spectrum of democratic consolidation is different 
today. At one end, Indonesian democracy continues to progress (albeit with its own 
weaknesses) and CSOs have become an increasingly prominent feature of the political 
arena. At the other hand, Thai democracy has regressed following a series of military 
coups against democratically-elected governments. In the middle sits the Philippines 
and its democracy shows some signs of progression, but continues to be inundated by 
corruption, armed conflict, and the dominance of political dynasties.  
 
This chapter seeks to explain the differences through a nuanced examination of the 
variables that have challenged democratic institutions in Indonesia, the Philippines, 
and Thailand. In each case study, the chapter will review the period between 2000 and 
2010 and then provide an analysis about what it has identified as the variables that 
effected the survivability of each country’s democratic institutions. But firstly, each 
case study will briefly look at the period prior to the year 2000, in order to identify 
common historical factors have led up to the year 2000. By doing so, we will have a 
greater understanding of the factors that have preserved regime survival in the past 
and the factors that have borne out after the fall of the authoritarian regime. 
 
Indonesia 
 
Indonesia is the youngest democracy in ASEAN, but it is frequently regarded as the 
most successful. In a short time, Indonesia’s political system has transformed from 
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being one of the most repressive in Southeast Asia to become the “freest and most 
transparent” country in the region.91 Nonetheless, its democracy remains fragile. The 
influence of New Order oligarchs over the decision-making process remain 
problematic; the military continues to have substantial political influence; and 
religious and ethnic tensions test the abilities of young democracies to protect 
minorities. Additionally, there is growing dissatisfaction amongst members of the 
public, including the middle class, as the government has failed to address the 
country’s chronic corruption problems, and other socioeconomic issues. This has 
created a nostalgia amongst elements of the Indonesian population for perceived 
Suharto-era stability, rendering democracy’s future in the country uncertain. But the 
experiences of the post-Suharto years have proven that while authoritarian elements 
of the Suharto-era remain, a strong and vocal middle class – through CSOs, think 
tanks, and the media – have prevented a reversal of Indonesia’s democratization 
process. 
 
The Suharto-era and the Road to Democracy 
 
Suharto rose to the presidency following a coup d’état that saw the removal of his 
predecessor, Sukarno. Coming to power during a politically and economically 
tumultuous time, Suharto was quick to consolidate his power and bring back 
considerable political stability by installing loyalists in strategic political positions, 
repressing civil and political liberties, and weakening the power of parliament. Suharto 
saw his government as the embodiment of Pancasila92 and any attempt to criticize him 
or his rule was punishable by imprisonment or exile.93 To further consolidate his 
power, he also aligned himself with the powerful military establishment, which he 
provided greater political and economic roles.94 Suharto also encouraged business 
dealings between military generals and ethnic Chinese-Indonesian businesspeople, 
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who transformed into oligarchs and became an important power base for his rule.95 
Meanwhile, when facing challenges to regime survival, both at the New Order’s outset 
and the end, his ruling members also scapegoated the ethnic Chinese with devastating 
consequences. 
 
Despite his repressive rule, Suharto was fairly popular amongst many members of 
Indonesian society, including the traditionally critical members of the middle class, 
for modernizing the Indonesian economy and bringing in a period of political and 
economic stability.96 However, immense corruption and embezzlement of the Suharto 
family created discontent amongst some oligarchs and prominent military generals, 
who have lost greater access to power and lucrative rent-seeking opportunities. In an 
attempt to diversity his power base from the military and the oligarchs, Suharto 
attempted to court the country’s majority Muslim population by forming closer ties to 
major Islamic organizations, which he encouraged to discuss and identify social and 
political issues that faced Indonesian Muslims.97 By allowing some level of scrutiny 
from the public, Suharto opened the way for his government’s eventual demise. 
Elements of the middle class began demanding political and economic reform and by 
1996, Megawati Sukarnoputri, chairwoman of the Indonesian Democratic Party and 
daughter of former President Sukarno, became the new face of opposition against the 
Suharto regime.98 In 1997, Indonesia was hit by the Asian Financial Crisis, which 
bankrupted many companies and led to high food and fuel prices. Following large 
public protests and riots that divided the country’s military and strengthened the 
opposition, Suharto resigned and was replaced by Bachruddin Jusuf Habibie, who 
initiated the period of democratic transition. 
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Post-Suharto Democracy 
 
Between 2000 and 2010, Indonesia was governed by three presidents: Abdurrahman 
Wahid (1999-2001), Megawati Sukarnoputri (2001-2004), and Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (2004-2014). This period – known as the era of reformasi – saw the 
emergence and strengthening of democratic institutions, the re-structuring or 
reformation of some Suharto-era institutions (e.g. Ministry of Information), and the 
emergence of CSOs as key support groups for the reform process. The liberalization 
of the political system led to the proliferation of thousands of CSOs, political parties, 
and non-government media outlets, allowing more space for political and social 
discussions. As some scholars have observed, the strength of Indonesia’s ongoing 
democratization process lies in the country’s large and vocal civil society, as many of 
these institutions have strengthened Indonesian democracy by acting as watchdogs, 
campaigners, and support for government-led reform.99 However, the period following 
the fall of the Suharto government was also fraught with numerous political and 
economic problems. Outside of the economic effects of the Asian Financial Crisis, 
there were growing ethnic, religious, and sectarian tensions. Additionally, the 
powerful political influence of the military continues to loom as a threat to the civilian 
government. 
 
Abdurrahman Wahid came to power in 1999 amidst rising sectarian violence, a 
troubled relationship between the civilian government and the military, and a slow-
growing economy. Wahid was unusually liberal-minded as a senior member of the 
country’s political elite in his time, but he was also deemed a “radical” by many 
observers.100 For instance, he called for the legalization of the communist party and 
apologised to the victims of the 1965-66 killings and persecution of communists, a 
sensitive topic to many members of the elite who had ties to the Suharto-era. Civil-
military relations also suffered a setback when Wahid attempted to restructure the 
military’s territorial command structure, thus attacking the foundation of the military’s 
political influence and institutional autonomy. His appointment of the reformist and 
outspoken Agus Wirahdikusumah, as head of the Strategic Reserves, also angered 
                                                          
99 Robinson, “The middle class and the bourgeoisie in Indonesia”, 88 
100 Aspinall, “Semi-Opponents in Power: The Abdurrahman Wahid and Megawati Soekarnoputri 
Presidencies”; Smith, Anthony. "Indonesia's Foreign Policy under Abdurrahman Wahid: Radical or 
Status Quo State?". Contemporary Southeast Asia 22:3 (2000) 498-526 
40 
 
conservative senior members of the military, for his bold plans for military reform. 
Additionally, his “dovish” approach to separatist unrests in Aceh and Papua marked a 
dramatic break with past practices and eased ethnic tensions in the area. However, it 
also antagonised many in the security establishment.101 
 
Wahid’s biggest failure was his treatment of key oligarchic allies. Having constructed 
a weak coalition when he came to office, Wahid further destabilized it by behaving 
erratically and being confrontational with the legislature. He isolated himself by 
sacking important loyalists and ministers from allied parties and taunting their leaders. 
Amongst the individuals he sacked was the loyalist, Wirahdikusumah, in an attempt 
to appease the military into siding with him. Eventually, he isolated himself from 
strategic political parties and failed to preserve his own reformist policies.102 Amongst 
these policies was his formerly dovish approach to the Aceh separatist movement, 
which he changed when he approved military operations in Aceh. Eventually, he tried 
to bring the military back into the political arena in order to gain its support for a 
decree to dissolve parliament and allow emergency rule. However, due to his declining 
popularity and poor relationship with the military, senior officers refused to come to 
his aid. Rather, the military stationed armoured military vehicles and 40,000 troops in 
Jakarta in a show of force.103 Eventually, he was forced from office by impeachment 
on 23 July 2001 and replaced by his vice-president, Megawati Sukarnoputri.104 
 
Megawati was an interesting comparison to Wahid. An aloof conservative, she 
stabilized civil-military relations by involving conservative military officers in the 
decision-making process for defence and security issues. She also appointed hawkish 
military officers and members of the New Order era to her cabinet, rather than 
reformers like under the Wahid era. She also backed the re-appointment of New Order 
era elites to strategic governor positions, often against the wishes of the local branches 
of her party. A particularly surprising move was her backing of General Sutiyoso as 
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governor of Jakarta. Sutiyoso was the main organizer of the violent military assault on 
Megawati loyalists who were protesting against her removal as head of the Indonesian 
Democratic Party in 1996. Such actions not only led to schisms within the party, but 
it also alienated her from many of her public supporters. Her presidency also resulted 
in the return of relatively authoritarian policies in the separatist regions of Aceh and 
Papua, such as the 2003 declaration of military emergency in Aceh (which led to gross 
human rights abuses) and the banning of any form of public condemnation of the 
Indonesian government.105 
 
However, the democratization process did not completely halt during Megawati’s 
presidency. Following Suharto’s ouster, CSOs were quick to move into watchdog and 
technical support roles in the reform process. These organizations remained very 
influential during the Megawati period and some CSO-led initiatives that began during 
the Habibie and Wahid periods only came to fruit under Megawati. For instance, CSOs 
managed to successfully campaign for the formation of the Corruption Eradication 
Commission, an independent government agency formed to tackle the country’s 
rampant corruption issue. CSOs were also successful in pushing forward various 
amendments to the constitution including the introduction of direct presidential 
elections. These two particular products of the Megawati-era would have positive 
implications for the future of Indonesian democracy, as they weakened oligarchic 
control in the political arena. Nonetheless, corruption continued to persist as a chronic 
issue that plagued the country’s bureaucracy and legal system. In 2004, disillusioned 
voters voted against electing Megawati to another term and she was replaced by Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono in the country’s first direct presidential elections. 
 
Yudhoyono ascended to the presidency during a period of unprecedented economic 
and political stability. His presidency also saw the decline of communal violence, 
including the end of the 30-year insurgency in Aceh and the return of political stability. 
He was also able to effectively deal with the country’s looming terrorist attacks. By 
successfully cooperating with American and Australian security agencies, Indonesia's 
counter-terrorist initiative became one of the most successful in the world.106 He was 
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also able to maintain a stable relationship with the military. While observers have 
noted that Yudhoyono was a genuine advocate of the removal of the military from 
politics, he was careful not to upset senior military officers and disturb the delicate 
relationship. A retired general himself, Yudhoyono understood that political stability 
and reform cannot be effectively done when the relationship between the civilian 
government and the military is disturbed. Thus, any reformist policies were ‘never 
[done] at the expense of the TNI’s [Indonesian Armed Forces] self-appointed core 
political functions of security and stability’.107 There were no attempts to limit or 
reform the territorial command structure or even address continued illegal business 
practices of the military. However, he appointed reformist generals to key cabinet 
positions in an attempt to gradually professionalize the military while appealing to the 
pro-reform segment of the population who remained disillusioned about the pace of 
reform.108 
 
Under the Yudhoyono presidency, Indonesia’s economy also improved considerably. 
Average growth rate was around 5% and Indonesia soon became a part of the exclusive 
club of one-trillion-dollar economies. Nonetheless, the Indonesian economy continued 
to be hampered by numerous obstacles. The lack of development in infrastructure 
remained a key problem in the country’s economy, with underdeveloped roads, ports, 
and electricity networks slowing down economic activity. Under the Yudhoyono 
presidency, the government spent on average around 4% of its GDP on infrastructural 
development – roughly half of what Suharto spent in the 1990s. Mietzner has 
identified that poor spending on infrastructure is a result of wasteful energy subsidies 
to benefit the middle class, which constituted 33% of total government expenditure. 
Additionally, the Yudhoyono-era saw little progress in combatting corruption, which 
continued to plague the legislature, bureaucracy, and legal system. Yudhoyono’s own 
Democrat Party was tainted by a series of high profile corruption cases that led to the 
downfalls of a number of prominent figures. 109 
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The failure of the Yudhoyono government to effectively address the country’s 
structural problems, corrupt legal system, and remove the military from politics 
reflected the constraints that his government faced from oligarchic actors. However, 
perhaps the most significant example of this is the Yudhoyono government’s failure 
to effectively protect the rights of religious minorities. As he feared a backlash from 
conservative Islamic parties in his coalition, Yudhoyono allowed conservative Muslim 
groups to push for new religious orthodoxy. As such, radical militias began attacking 
members of minority Islamic groups, such as the Ahmadi sect and Shiites, as well as 
non-Muslim groups.110 
 
Many members of Indonesian society have grown increasingly dissatisfied with 
Yudhoyono’s performance. While he was a fairly popular politician in his first term 
with an approval rating that averaged over 70%, his approval rating dropped to 47.2% 
in 2010, the lowest throughout his presidency.111 Yudhoyono’s failure to effectively 
address political corruption and rising religious tensions disillusioned many members 
of society, particularly the middle class, who had high hopes that democracy could 
effectively address the burning political and economic issues of the Suharto era. For 
many, the era of Reformasi continued to pose similar problems and the post-Reformasi 
era has been no exception. Corruption and income inequality continue to be persistent 
problems for many Indonesians. With the added problems posed by ethnic tensions, 
increasing religious intolerance, and public political battles between oligarchs, some 
members of the middle class are nostalgic for the politically stable Suharto-era.112 The 
results of the 2014 presidential election, where the populist Jakarta Governor Joko 
Widodo defeated Prabowo Subianto, a controversial Suharto-era general, by less than 
7% seems to reassert the notion that Indonesians are increasingly losing confidence in 
the country’s young democracy. 
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Analysis 
 
Despite a number of potential threats to its democratic institutions, Indonesia’s 
democratization process continued to progress from 2000 until 2010. The resilience 
of CSOs, which have acted as platforms for citizen discussion, watchdogs, supporting 
actors, and campaigners have ensured that all authoritarian policies are properly 
publicized and addressed. Additionally, while Indonesia remains a poor, developing 
country, it has so far managed to prevent forms of severe regression. Some scholars 
have often attributed this to the country’s growing middle class population, which 
continues to demand greater political and economic autonomy, as well as for enhanced 
government efforts to address economic and political woes, such as corruption.113 
However, Indonesia’s ongoing process of consolidation also faces many challenges. 
The dominance of oligarchs within the political sphere, the looming threat of military 
actors, and the chronic effects of corruption continue to tarnish the image of 
Indonesia’s democracy. 
  
The analysis in this case study, largely validates the structural approach to the 
emergence and/or consolidation of democracy where structural actors from the 
authoritarian era continue to shape and pose obstacles to young democracies. The three 
experiences under Wahid, Megawati, and Yudhoyono suggest that the co-optation of 
the military is an important factor in democratic survival. However, the process has 
been one where the military have faced, on an incremental basis, increasing restraints 
against their exercise of political power. Under Wahid and Yudhoyono, conservative 
senior military officers had increasingly smaller influence on the democratization 
process than under Suharto or Megawati, as they were done through the placement of 
reform-minded and loyal military officers to strategic positions. However, Wahid’s 
eagerness to bring complete civilian control over the military and completely remove 
its influence from politics resulted in devastating consequences for him, as the lack of 
a powerful backer meant that he was easily impeached by parliament. By cozing up to 
the military and enhancing its political influence, Megawati managed to gain 
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considerable support from conservative political parties. However, it also resulted in 
hawkish and authoritarian policies toward separatist areas, like Aceh and Papua. 
Yudhoyono made the conscience and effective decision to gradually limit the 
military’s influence over politics by assigning moderate and reform-minded generals 
to key positions. By doing so, Yudhoyono has created a fairly stable civil-military 
relationship which has seen the gradual political influence of the military waning out. 
 
Weak political parties and disorganized coalitions have also impacted the behaviours 
of the three presidents. Wahid’s erratic behaviour and radical policies alienated him 
from many party oligarchs. Megawati learned from Wahid’s mistakes and attempted 
to maintain power by aligning herself with more conservative parties, resulting in her 
government’s reluctance to address serious past issues, such as human rights abuses. 
Yudhoyono was also unable to address the issue of religious minority rights, as he 
feared reprisal from the orthodox Islamic parties. Additionally, weak political parties 
have made money politics a commonality, particularly in the legislature, where party 
loyalty remains very low. Winters even observes that disheartened oligarchs who lose 
party chairmanship have often just made their own political parties.114 Due to the 
circumstances of rapidly shifting allegiances, opposition parties do not act as an 
effective checks-and-balances. 
 
What of other variables? It seems that income inequality and poverty may act as long-
term threats to democratic institutions. The victory of democratic movements in the 
late-1990s raised hopes that democracy can solve an array of economic problems that 
resulted from the Suharto-era. While Indonesia’s economy has significantly improved 
in recent years, there is still far more that needs to be done. The failure of Reformasi-
era governments to address issues of poor infrastructural development, corruption, 
widening income inequality, and rampant poverty have disillusioned many members 
of society who have previously supported the democratic movements, leading to the 
rising popularity of Suharto-era figures, such as Prabowo, who bring up nostalgic 
images of Suharto-era economic stability. 
 
Indonesia’s great ethnic diversity does not seem to pose a large threat to its democratic 
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institutions from 2000 and 2010. Following the fall of Suharto, ethnic tensions 
threatened to completely fragment the already-unstable country with pogroms, 
separatist movements, and ethnic clashes. However, under the Wahid, Megawati, and 
Yudhoyono governments, ethnic tensions were quickly subsided through a series of 
reconciliation, aggressive actions, and then reconciliation again. While there remains 
some form of ethnic tensions in Aceh, Papua, and Sulawesi, violence has been greatly 
diminished. On the other hand, religious conflict has worsened in recent years, 
particularly during the later years of the Yudhoyono era. Increasing attacks on 
religious minorities have weakened democratic institutions in the country, particularly 
considering the rather passive response of the government. Yudhoyono’s attempt to 
maintain a good relationship with powerful but orthodox Islamic organizations have 
meant that religious conflict, rather than ethnic tensions, remain as the key behavioural 
factor that hampers the democratization process. 
 
Despite its shortcomings, Indonesia’s democratization has so far managed to go 
progressively well. Indonesia’s democratic institutions during the period between 
2000 and 2010 has faced considerable challenges and obstacles from a number of 
factors, ranging from the ongoing dominance of oligarchs to the looming threat of 
military takeover. Today, while the military’s political influence has been significantly 
reduced, oligarchs and weak political parties continue to prevent any progressive 
reforms to be passed. Additionally, government inaction in the midst of attacks against 
religious minorities has put to question Indonesia’s determination to preserve civil 
liberties in the post-Suharto era. As such, it should be of no surprise that the public is 
becoming disillusioned with the political system. While CSOs and pro-reform public 
figures have ensured that democratic institutions continue to be preserved in 
Indonesia, the biggest challenge to Indonesian democracy will be to address its 
tarnished image. 
 
The Philippines 
 
The study of democracy in the Philippines has long been dominated by scholarly 
interests in the so-called “People Power Revolutions” of 1986 and 2001, which saw 
the middle class-led overthrows of President Ferdinand Marcos and Joseph Estrada, 
respectively. However, while the overthrows of these regimes may reflect the public’s 
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desire for less corrupt or more liberal democratic leadership, in the latter instance, it 
also reflects public discontent over the failure of democracy to effectively address 
issues of corruption and weak state capacity. While the Philippines has not faced any 
sharp decline to authoritarianism, there is an incremental decline, which has been 
signposted by the extra-constitutional removal of President Joseph Estrada in 2001, 
the evident electoral malpractices of Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo in the 2005, and the 
attacks on civil liberties since the rise of Arroyo. This makes the period between 2000 
and 2010 a very important era of research for the study of democratic survival. 
 
The Struggles of Early Democratization 
 
Philippine democracy has the distinction of being the oldest in Asia, having been 
adopted in 1935. But after nearly 40-years of “cacique democracy”115, Philippine 
democracy was halted by President Ferdinand Marcos’ declaration of martial law in 
1973. Citing economic woes, as well as security problems caused by Marxist 
insurgents, Marcos also argues that in order to deliver the economic development that 
the Philippines needed, the regime had to be strong enough to overcome reactionary 
measures from the “old society”, particularly the old landed oligarchy. Observers 
argue that during the earlier years of martial law, Marcos enjoyed widespread middle 
class support, as the government established law and order in a country that has been 
called “the wild west of Asia”.116 While the Philippine economy temporarily 
improved, corruption and state inefficiency, which were brought about by cronyism, 
only made economic stability temporary. Furthermore, security tensions in southern 
Philippines were quick to intensify, as separatists managed to gain sympathy from 
many inhabitants in Mindanao, due to the Marcos government’s hawkish and messy 
response towards separatists.117 The assassination of Benigno Aquino Jr., Marcos’ 
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biggest political rival, greatly alienated Marcos from many of his supporters, including 
those within the middle class. The incident, along with anger over the deteriorating 
economy, triggered widespread uproar in the Philippines and massive protest 
movements arose throughout the country, particularly Metro Manila. Accusations that 
Marcos rigged presidential elections in 1986 led to the first “People Power 
Revolution”, which saw the massive public protests, the defection of key military 
players, and the eventual downfall of Marcos and his cronies. 
 
For the first 12-years of the post-Marcos era, the Philippines was governed by two 
reform-minded presidents: Corazon Aquino and Fidel Ramos, both prominent 
opposition figures in the 1986 uprising (the latter defected from the Marcos camp). It 
was an important priority for Marcos’ successors to remove any negative associations 
with the Marcos government. The middle class, through CSOs and even the Catholic 
Church, were invited to policy discussions to assist in creating a series of reforms for 
the state bureaucracy, election system, and land laws, among others.118 Despite the 
differences in procedural objectives, strategies, and organizational structures, the anti-
Marcos organizations had one common overarching objective: advance an ideology of 
“clean” democracy and dismantle the corrupt and patrimonial establishment that had 
been formed under the Marcos presidency.119 However, Aquino and Ramos were also 
careful not to upset their relationship with the oligarchic elite and the military, as they 
recognized that any attempt to radically disrupt their political influence could result in 
a political backlash. As such, the Philippines gradually reverted back to the “cacique 
democracy” that they were once before. Hutchcroft has perhaps given the best 
descriptions of the outcomes of both the Aquino and Ramos presidencies: 120  
 
‘Corazon Aquino, widow of a martyred politician, might be 
characterized as an elite restorationist, since her major 
achievement was to rebuild the elite-dominated democratic 
structures undermined by her authoritarian predecessor. 
Former general Fidel Ramos was the military reformer who 
achieved considerable success in bringing about economic 
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reform through deft manipulation of old-style patronage 
politics.’ 
 
The Aquino and Ramos eras saw the emergence of CSOs and enhanced participatory 
politics. However, little outside of that seem to have changed since the pre-Marcos 
era. The political arena continued to be dominated by political dynasties and money 
politics continues to plague the electoral system. As such, many Filipinos grew 
increasingly disillusioned with the democratic system. 
 
Philippine Democracy from 2000-2010 
 
From 2000 until 2010, the Philippines was governed under three presidents: Joseph 
Estrada (1998-2001), Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (2001-2010), and Benigno Aquino III 
(2010-present). However, as Aquino only began his term in June 2010, this paper will 
primarily focus on Estrada and Arroyo. During this period, the country’s so-called 
“cacique democracy” continued to be very fragile. The dominance of the oligarchic 
elite, weak state institutions, widespread corruption, and weak political parties have 
eroded Philippine democracy and disillusioned the Filipino people. As Dressel argues, 
‘effective participation and true representation are largely illusory’.121 Dissatisfaction 
with parliament and political parties led to attempts by the public and rogue factions 
in the military to forcibly remove politicians or express anger outside formal political 
structures. While the political and social influence of CSOs and other sections of the 
middle class have improved since the post-Marcos era, the challenges posed by the 
Philippines’ “cacique democracy” can pose a threat to the country’s electoral system 
itself. 
 
Joseph Estrada came to power in a landslide victory in 1998, following the Asian 
Financial Crisis. While he was unpopular with many members of the urban middle 
class, he was a popular figure amongst the larger rural and lower classes. A film actor, 
he was a well-known figure who had campaigned on a “pro-poor campaign”, which 
had promised to tackle rising unemployment and the lack of affordable housing for 
                                                          
121 Dressel, Bjorn. "The Philippines: how much real democracy?". International Political Science 
Review 32:529 (2011): 530. doi:10.1177/0192512111417912 
50 
 
the country’s poor. He was also fairly popular amongst the urban lower class, who 
were disillusioned by the country’s corrupt and nepotistic political system. Rocamara 
observes one basis for the support of Estrada by the urban poor was because he mocked 
the “bourgeois codes” of the traditional elite by dallying in nightclubs, casinos, and 
the abodes of his mistresses.122 But by running as a populist politician, he was not 
liked by many members of the reformist elite. The urban middle class also disliked his 
close ties to Marcos. A former Marcos supporter, he lost considerable political power 
following Marcos’ fall, but his popularity amongst the poor allowed him to claim the 
vice-presidential position under Ramos.123 His presidential campaign was also well 
funded by Marcos supporters.124 As a result, Estrada’s ascension to the presidency 
brought many Marcos supporters and allies into the centre of power once more. 
 
As president, Estrada failed to effectively deliver his promises. Unlike other populist 
leaders in the region, such as Thailand’s Thaksin, Estrada never challenged the 
political influence or prerogatives of his elite opponents or overtaxed the country's 
emerging middle class on a large scale. Rather, observers argue that he was far more 
concerned with rewarding or repaying old debts to friends and family members, 
including Marcos-era politicians who supported his presidential campaign.125 As such, 
Estrada’s political opponents and the middle class felt no need to fundamentally 
subvert democracy and rather, collaborated to orchestrate his removal. Estrada also 
alienated considerable support from rural supporters when he declared “all-out war” 
in the fight against the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) in the Southern 
Philippines island of Mindanao.126  The war caused casualties on both sides. 
Watchdogs have warned of gross violations of human rights abuses, leading to greater 
tensions between the island’s “Bangsamoro” people and the central government. 
 
In October 2010, Governor Luis Singson, a long-time associate of President Joseph 
Estrada, accused Estrada of receiving millions of pesos from an illegal numbers game. 
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This was followed by an outflow of condemnation and accusations of corruption by 
politicians and prominent members of society, including the influential Manila 
Cardinal Jaime Sin. These accusations caused public uproar and thousands of 
demonstrators flooded the EDSA Highway (location of first People Power Revolution) 
once more. When Estrada was not successfully impeached through the senate, the 
military sided with the protestors and removed Estrada from power. This extra-
constitutional act has been widely criticized by academics, the media, and 
policymakers as an attack on Philippine democracy.127 Estrada was replaced by his 
vice-president, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. 
 
While Arroyo ascended to the presidency during a period of political and legitimacy 
crisis, there was much optimism that things would change.128 Promising to transform 
‘our politics of personality and patronage’ to ‘a new politics of party programs and 
process of dialogue with the people’, many hoped that she would address the 
burdening dominance of “political dynasties” in the political arena.129 However, her 
presidency saw numerous corruption scandals, which implicated strategic political 
allies. Her family has also been implicated in a number of serious scandals, which 
continued to damage her reputation. A 2007 survey, by Pulse Asia Inc., reported that 
a majority of Filipinos believe that Arroyo is the most corrupt president in the past 21 
years, even more so than Marcos and Estrada.130 Some of the scandals involved 
machinations – such as money laundering and embezzlement – that are apparently 
connected to the 2004 general elections, in which Arroyo competed against Estrada 
ally, Fernando Poe Jr. The “Hello Garci” scandal of June 2005 seemed to confirm 
vote-rigging, which greatly damaged her public image.131 
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Despite numerous corruption scandals, Arroyo managed to politically survive and 
even win a second term in 2004. Some scholars argue that it was because of her success 
in improving Philippine macroeconomic growth132. As a practicing economist, Arroyo 
made the economy the main focus of her presidency. On average GDP growth under 
her stewardship was 5%, with the growth rising to 7% in 2007.133 This is the highest 
growth rate since the Marcos era. Nonetheless, reports from the United Nations seem 
to suggest that the Philippine government has not managed to improve the lives of its 
poorer citizens. A 2008 United Nations report suggested that poverty levels were 
worsening. The study reveals that from 2003-2006, the number of poor Filipinos has 
increased by 3.8 million.134 Additionally, Social Weather Stations have revealed that 
hunger levels amongst the country’s population have also increased to a record 4.3 
million households in 2008.135  
 
More scholars seem to suggest that her success was through a series of strategic 
coalescing and bribery. Arroyo has also managed to extend her influence on the 
country’s powerful oligarchic families through the wily use of patronage within both 
parliament and provincial governments. According to Rolando Andaya Jr., Arroyo’s 
Budget Secretary, Arroyo had the sole discretion to pick the senators and 
congressperson to be given entitlements from the “Priority Development Assistance 
Fund” – the pork barrel. Opposition legislators are often advised not to criticize the 
Arroyo government in order to secure pork barrel.136 Quimpo has noted that bribery 
and strategic use of patronage have weakened any form of opposition against her and 
fend off a number of attempts at impeachment.137 Such acts of bribery have destroyed 
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the very sanctity of opposition parties in the Philippines, which must act as watchdogs 
for government accountability. 
 
Arroyo appointed key loyalists to top military positions throughout her presidency. 
She also involved them in security-related decision-making. However, in order to 
ensure their complete loyalty, Arroyo had to court military favour, paying the rank and 
file with subsidized housing, increased benefits, and pay rises. As a result, Arroyo was 
always surrounded by powerful and supportive military officers whenever she is in 
power. She also began appointing retired military officers to key positions in the 
cabinet. Under her stewardship, there was a significant increase in ‘the influence and 
participation of the military in running the country’s state affairs’.138 Nonetheless, by 
allocating top positions to loyalists, Arroyo disenfranchised many lower ranking 
military officers. As a result, Arroyo has survived three mutiny attempts by rogue 
factions of the military. The most prominent of these mutinies was perhaps the 2006 
mutiny, which resulted in the declaration of a state of emergency. Arroyo justified her 
declaration by arguing that it was necessary to restore order and amidst the ‘clear and 
present danger to our republic’.139 Nonetheless, critics have claimed that this was an 
attempt to seize greater political power, due to her sagging influence and popularity.140 
 
Arroyo’s term has also seen a tendency to ignore the rule of law, which has led to 
problems of personal safety. Statistics show a 28% decline (2005–2008) in the crime 
rate in Manila, there has been an alarming rise in extrajudicial killings and 
disappearances of civil society activists, representatives of the church, and 
journalists.141 Reporters Without Borders has even ranked the Philippines as one of 
the most dangerous countries for journalists after Iraq. An accumulation of these 
actions have led to the downgrading of the Philippines’ rating by Freedom House from 
“free” to “partly free” in 2006.142 
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Analysis 
 
Philippine democracy has suffered fundamental setbacks in the 2000s. While the 
country's political system gradually liberalized under Corazon Aquino and Ramos, the 
political reforms did not seem to be enough to prevent the emergence of Estrada and 
Arroyo. Democratic institutions under Estrada and Arroyo were both under attack 
from within the political system and through other non-constitutional means. The 
effects have been felt in all sectors of society, with rising security problems, increased 
poverty, and the lasting dominance of political dynasties shaping the country’s so-
called “cacique democracy”. 
 
Like in Indonesia, structural variables seem to largely explain why democratic 
institutions have been under threat. Weak political parties and the dominance of 
political dynasties have created a culture of money politics and difficult to participate 
in for those outside the oligarchy. These families have also weakened the institutional 
power of political parties, as politicians are dependent on clientelist ties with the 
electorate, leaving political parties ideologically weak. This is perhaps most visible 
under the Arroyo government. Arroyo has taken advantage of the country’s weak 
political parties to bribe rivals to support her, bully politicians who criticize her rule, 
and allow human rights abuses by provincial governments just to gain their support. 
Unlike in Indonesia, the executive seems to hold far more power than the legislature, 
allowing the president to enact policies that benefit their own party without great 
difficulty. The weakness of the opposition parties are reflected in their lack of ability 
to properly address the government’s poor record of governance, which has allowed 
corruption to soar and the security situation in some parts of the country to worsen, 
leading to high murder rates. Estrada was far less successful in his attempts to 
consolidate power. While, he was very popular amongst the country’s rural and poor 
population, he unsuccessfully remained in power because of his top priority of 
awarding allies and allies only. The corruption scandal that broke out just a few years 
after the Asian Financial Crisis not only allowed his rivals to justify reasons to oust 
him, but it also allowed them to enlist the help of the people as well. 
 
The 2001 People Power Revolution reflects public anger and disenchantment with the 
country’s oligarchic political system and corruption. These issues remain pertinent 
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threats to Philippine democracy, as they tarnish the image of the political system and 
create a mood of cynicism amongst members of the middle class over the effectiveness 
of political participation. Romero et al. argue that low level of law enforcement creates 
an ‘atmosphere of the “self-help” wherein citizens, families, interest groups, and 
communities are relatively free to pursue their own interests, including negotiating 
and bargaining with politicians and bureaucrats for electoral favours in exchange for 
public goods and services’.143 
 
One of the successes of the reform movements during the post-Marcos era is the 
expansion of individual liberties, which have been embodied in the Philippine 
constitution. This includes the enhancement of basic law and highlighted political 
discourse.144 However, due to the weak capacity of law enforcement agencies and 
political parties, the state struggles to enforce laws, which leads to rampant corruption 
and little government transparency. These problems have negative implications on the 
democratization process. Like in Indonesia, it creates disillusionment amongst 
members of the middle class by negatively portraying electoral democracy as a system 
that is ineffective in tackling the country’s economic and political woes. This creates 
an aura of cynicism, over the political system as a whole, particularly amongst the 
middle class, which has, in the past, viewed itself as a progressive but moderate 
balance against the oligarchic families. 
 
Thailand 
 
Democracy in Thailand has had a short and erratic history. For around 40 years since 
the 1932 Siamese revolution transformed Thailand into a constitutional monarchy, 
Thailand was governed by a powerful military and bureaucratic elite. There have been 
several experimentations with democracy, but all failed because of political 
interferences from the military. But in 1997, Thailand was officially recognized as a 
“free” country by Freedom House, with its five-year old democracy achieving 
significant results. CSOs have grown increasingly prominent in the political arena, the 
military’s political influence has been greatly reduced, and an expanding middle class 
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has demanded greater political and economic autonomy from the state. However, by 
2014, Thailand was governed once more by a powerful military elite. The period of 
2000 and 2010 is a crucial moment in the history of Thai democracy, as it provides 
critical insight about key causal factors behind the sudden democratic regression. 
 
Period of “Half-Democracy” 
 
Thailand began its first attempt at democratic transition in 1973, following widespread 
public protests that saw the downfall of Prime Minister Thanom Kittikachorn. 
Protesters, largely led academics, were dissatisfied with the Thai military junta for 
severe political corruption, poor management of state resources, and repression of 
political freedom.145 However, attempts to democratize failed after three years, when 
the government was overthrown by the military, leading to the return of military 
government. Nonetheless, the military never had the same amount of political power 
it had prior to 1973. Thailand entered a period of “half-democracy”, where the military 
and bureaucratic elite entered a power-sharing agreement with the middle class by 
enhancing the role of opposition political parties.146 Under this power-sharing 
agreement, Thailand saw the emergence of new political parties that consisted of 
academics and professionals. Party politicians also became increasingly prominent in 
a country where the military had traditionally dominated parliament. This period of 
political liberalization was led by General Prem Tinsulanonda, who has also overseen 
the industrialization of the Thai economy. As a result, Thailand saw an expanding 
middle class that demanded greater political and economic autonomy from 
government, including the gradual removal of the military from politics.147 
 
In 1992, elected Prime Minister Chatichai Choonhavan was overthrown in a coup by 
the armed forces, which accused the elected government of corruption and abuse of 
power. The appointment of General Suchinda Kraprayoon caused widespread uproar 
amongst the country’s middle class population, who were aggravated with the 
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military’s political influence.148 This led to massive protests in Bangkok, known as 
“Black May”, which was led by students, academics, and bureaucrats. While these 
protests were divided and had different interests, they all demanded the return of 
civilian rule in Thailand and the removal of the Thai military from politics. On the 20th 
of May 1992, the Thai monarchy condemned the actions of Suchinda and the 
protestors, leading to Suchinda’s resignation and a general election. 
 
Civilian Chuan Leekpai was elected into power in 1992 and he presided over a period 
of political liberalization, which saw the stabilization of civilian-military relations, the 
enhancement of participatory politics, and the emergence of CSOs as important actors 
in the political arena.149 While Thailand’s democracy had been reported by a number 
of organizations, such as Freedom House, to be improving up until 2006, several 
factors in the 1990s seemed to have contributed to the eventual regression of 
Thailand’s democracy. Firstly, free elections led to the rise of corrupt and populist 
figures, such as Prime Minister Banharn Silpa-archa, who utilized money-based 
electoral politics and angered the so-called “network monarchy”.150 Secondly, the 
passing of the so-called “People’s Constitution” in 1997 had some unintended 
consequences. The constitution sought to alter the governance system in terms of 
executive stability, accountability, and participation. However, critics argue that it 
‘worked too well’ and have strengthened the role of the executive and legislative 
branches and weakened the influence of the network monarchy and military.151 The 
desire to reclaim more political power by these two actors would harm Thailand’s 
future progress with democratization. 
 
21st Century Democratization 
 
From 2000 until 2010, Thailand was governed under five (not including military or 
acting) prime ministers: Chuan Leekpai (1997-2001), Thaksin Shinawatra (2001-
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2006), Surayud Chulanont (2006-2008), Samak Sundaravej (2008), Somchai 
Wongsawat (2008), and Abhisit Vejjajiva (2008-2011). However, this paper will 
primarily focus on the Thaksin, Samak, Somchai, and Abhisit premierships. While 
Chuan’s leadership is important to an understanding of the precedence behind 
Thaksin’s premiership, his contributions largely occurred during the 1990s. Surayud 
was installed by the military and as such, this paper will not analyse their leadership, 
as the central question necessitates a focus on elected figures. The success of the 1997 
constitution has left many organizations and scholars to assume that Thai democracy 
would be the most enduring in Southeast Asia.152 However, from 2000 until 2010, 
Thailand saw a sudden regression of its democratization process. The increasing 
influence of the legislative and the executive branches have weakened the influence 
of the network monarchy and military. Additionally, money politics have further 
weakened political parties and polarized Thai society. In present-day Thailand, 
Thaksin Shinawatra has emerged as, arguably, the most polarizing figure in Thai 
politics today. 
 
Thaksin came to power in 2001 on a populist platform that promised, among others, a 
farmer debt moratorium, a universal health care program, and soft loans for every 
community. These populist policies distinguished him from past prime ministers, who 
were deemed to be aloof and more concerned with the largely Bangkok-based middle 
class. Unlike Estrada, Thaksin has had some success in delivering his promises, 
making him a very popular figure amongst the country’s rural poor. For instance, 
Thaksin initiated programs, like the village-managed microcredit development funds 
and low-interest agricultural loans, which benefited the country’s rural poor. As a 
result of his policies, nationwide poverty fell from 21.3% to 11.3%. He also introduced 
subsidized universal healthcare, which helped increase access to healthcare from 76% 
of the population to 96%. These ambitious policies made him a very popular figure 
amongst Thailand’s poor and rural areas to the point that many had revered him.153  
 
However, Thaksin was less popular amongst members of the network monarchy and 
military. Distancing himself from this elite, observers argue that Thaksin capitalized 
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on a widespread Thai sentiment against the political elite. For instance, he has accused 
them of being responsible for the suffering during the Asian Financial Crisis and 
through deals made with the International Monetary Fund.154 However, some scholars 
argue that the network monarchy had been primarily upset over how Thaksin gradually 
limited their political influence. McCargo observes that the network monarchy was 
particularly upset over the removal of networks loyal to Prem (who was chair of the 
King’s Privy Council) in a wide range of government sectors and instead replacing 
them with loyalists and business partners.155 As Thaksin’s power grew, the network 
monarchy could do little but watch the changes occur. 
 
Thaksin also limited military influence over security-related matters. Under his 
stewardship, Thaksin adopted an aggressive approach to the southern Thai 
insurgencies and declared a “War on Drugs”. In both conflicts, Thaksin did not grant 
full authority to generals, particularly in regards to discussions with insurgents. As a 
number of prominent senior military officers, including Prem, were assigned to lead 
the conflict, their reputations were on the line. As a result, the ineffectiveness of 
Thaksin’s strategy not only led to many casualties on the military’s side, but it also led 
to public criticism of senior military generals. Another cause of anger was the selection 
system for promotions. As Thaksin only promoted loyalists, many prominent officers 
were set aside for Thaksin allies. Ockey observes that in some cases, senior positions 
went to Thaksin allies over more experienced officers. Thus, the politicization of 
promotions led to tensions between soldiers and also between soldiers and 
politicians.156 
 
Thaksin was also unpopular amongst the middle class population. While his leadership 
has benefited many members of the rural class, they have often been done at greater 
costs for the middle class. For instance, many doctors and health officials have 
criticized Thaksin’s universal healthcare policies, as it was underfunded and increased 
workloads for health care employees.157 Additionally, the middle class was concerned 
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over Thaksin’s increasingly autocratic leadership, which began attacking civil and 
political liberties, including press freedom and the legal system. Thaksin devalued the 
importance of parliament, neutralised the check-and-balance bodies of the 1997 
constitution, and said on a number of occasions in public that rule of law, democracy 
and human rights were not important because they often got in the way of “working 
for the people”. He also described criticism by press or opposition as “destructive”.158 
Additionally, the “War on Drugs” and the Southern Thailand insurgencies caused 
many civilian casualties, many of which remained unsolved.159 
 
By the time he was re-elected in 2005, Thailand had been polarized by the effects of 
his rule. In early 2006, the Shinawatra family sold their entire stake in Shin 
Corporation to Temasek holdings, raking in nearly US$2 billion tax-free. The deal 
made Thaksin the target of accusations of corruption and selling an asset of national 
importance to a foreign entity and led to large anti-Thaksin rallies. In September of 
that year, Thailand’s 14-year process of democratic consolidation was upturned by 
Thaksin’s overthrow by the armed forces and the return of a military junta in power. 
The military’s justification was that Thaksin was ‘meddling with democratic 
institutions, his unprecedented polarization of society, his actions bordering on lèse-
majesté, and his corrupt behaviour’.160 His removal was met with anger by rural 
supporters and even amongst some members of the middle class. This polarization 
would dominate Thai politics to this day, as supporters of Thaksin and of the monarchy 
(which primarily consists of middle class Bangkokians) would frequently clash and 
paralyse Bangkok. This polarization led to the rise of two prominent pressure groups: 
the royalist, largely middle class People’s Alliance for Democracy (PAD, also known 
as “Yellow Shirts”) and the pro-Thaksin United Front for Democracy Against 
Dictatorship (UDD, also known as “Red Shirts”). 
 
While Thaksin was removed from power, observers have noted that he remained a 
powerful “kingmaker”.161 The ascension of Thaksin supporter, Samak Sundaravej, in 
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the 2007 elections resulted in condemnation from many segments of Thai society, 
including the network monarchy. Samak was controversial in Thai politics, 
particularly after announcing that ‘I [Samak] am a nominee of Prime Minister Thaksin, 
I will make the party strong so that democracy can be restored in this country’.162 
Attempts to remove him from power by the opposition failed, due to his control over 
a majority of seats in parliament. However, the polarizing effects of Thaksin would 
soon lead to Samak’s downfall. A month after Samak’s prime ministership, Thaksin 
returned to Thailand, hoping that Samak would accomplish his promises of amending 
the military-backed constitutions and support an amnesty bill for politicians banned 
from politics, such as Thaksin.163 However, this resulted in large protests by the PAD, 
which paralysed Bangkok and drove Thaksin out of Thailand once more. The PAD 
protesters not only demanded the arrest of Thaksin, but they also demanded the 
removal of all Thaksin influences from politics. After accidental clashes with security 
forces left two protesters dead and 400 injured, public support, including that of the 
monarchy, shifted against the government and with the PAD.164 In September, Samak 
was removed from office by the constitutional court for contravening the conflict of 
interests law and was replaced by another Thaksin supporter, Somchai Wongsowat.165 
However, Somchai presided over a period of political turmoil that saw key state 
structure and institutions, such as the airport and parliament, blockaded by protestors. 
While security forces attempted to address the threats posed by the protestors, there 
was no serious attempt by the police or the military to intervene. Eventually, the 
constitutional court removed Somchai from office and called for renewed elections. 
 
Abhisit Vejjajiva came to power amidst the Global Financial Crisis and in the 
aftermath of the 2008 political turmoil in Thailand. He came to power mainly through 
the support of the network monarchy and his ability to win over parties that had 
originally sided with Thaksin.166 While his ascension to the prime ministership was 
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approved by the network monarchy, some scholars feared that the non-democratic 
elements of Thai politics in the 1990s would return. For instance, Charoensin-o-larn 
states that the appointing of Abhisit marked a return of the ‘old polluted type of 
dirty/money politics typical in Thai politics…’.167 To make matters worse, allegations 
of widespread corruption tainted Abhisit’s administration. 
 
In early 2010, hundreds of thousands of UDD protesters demanded that Abhisit and 
his government stepped down and call for new elections, as they believed that Abhisit's 
Democrat Party was not a majority party, but rather a coalition formed under military 
pressure. At the end of March, Abhisit’s government agreed to discuss a possible 
compromise, but there were disagreements over the election date. This led to an 
escalation of protests and after attempts to storm parliament, eventual clashes with 
security forces. Abhisit declared a state of emergency, which provided the military the 
authority to restore order, causing the mood of the protesters to switch to a high 
expectation of violence.168 One year later, Abhisit announced that elections would take 
place in July 2011, six months earlier than scheduled, leading to the ascension of 
Yingluck Shinawatra.  
 
Analysis 
 
The strength of Thailand’s democratic institutions are with its large middle class 
population and its vocal, pro-reform CSOs. Thailand’s democracy has come a long 
way since the first attempt at democratic transition in 1973. But, gradually since the 
1992 Black May protests, the polarization of Thai society has kept Thailand from 
embracing a full-fledged participatory democracy and political stability, both at the 
national and at the local level. Throughout the 1990s, it was apparent that the network 
monarchy and the military were not comfortable watching their political influence 
fade away. This is especially in the face of polarizing and pro-rural figures, like 
Banharn and Thaksin. 
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Like in Indonesia and the Philippines, structural variables have created the most lasting 
impacts on Thailand’s democratization process. The strengthening of parliament in the 
1980s led to the emergence of new political parties, many of which were personalistic 
and governed by oligarchs. Thaksin’s formation of the Thai Rak Thai Party is a clear 
example of such situations. Thaksin utilized his party and created it as a “brand”, 
which he used to push his populist and non-ideological agenda to win votes and create 
larger coalitions. Additionally, the ineffectiveness of opposition parties to pose 
challenges to Thaksin’s party further prove the prevalence of money politics in the 
country, as rivals were often bought.169 This has resulted in weak coalitions, such as 
that under Abhisit, and the failure of the opposition party to effectively address the 
autocratic actions of Thaksin’s government. 
 
But the weakness of the country’s political parties are also reflected in their inferior 
status to the military and the network monarchy. In the absence of parties as strong 
political abodes, informal institutions and connections have gained prevalence in Thai 
political sphere. The military possesses significant amount of political power, 
compared to those in Indonesia and the Philippines. As such, in order for there to be 
any successful attempt at democratic consolidation, there has to be a stable relationship 
between the civilian government and the military. Samak and Somchai, with their 
close ties to Thaksin, had no chance of forming a good relationship with the network 
monarchy. As a result, security forces that are loyal to those in the network monarchy 
refused to come and aid Samak and Somchai when Thailand was engulfed in crises in 
2008. On the other hand, the Democrat Party, under Chuan and then Abhisit, has been 
successful in maintaining a stable relationship with the military. By allowing senior 
military officers and their loyalists to occupy strategic positions, the governments of 
Chuan and Abhisit were able to survive without much harm from the military. Thaksin 
did exactly opposite of Chuan and Abhisit, resulting in the return of the military to 
power. 
 
The issue of income inequality also seems to pose more devastating consequences in 
Thailand than in Indonesia and the Philippines. The emergence of pro-rural, but 
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corrupt figures, like Thaksin, have divided Thai society to the point that it has 
threatened a number of governments after Thaksin’s removal. His forced removal 
from office angered his rural supporters, which formed large protest movements that 
have clashed with both security forces and opposing protesters. As a result, no 
government after his were able to complete a full term. Abhisit was amongst these 
prime ministers who was forced out of power by protests and have resorted to the use 
of force in order to quell the protesters that have paralysed Bangkok. The polarization 
of Thai society poses significant security and political implications, which threaten the 
survivability of Thai democracy. 
 
Today, the democratization process in Thailand has regressed as a result of two 
military coups. Thaksin has emerged as a polarizing figure whose supporters have 
clashed with anti-Thaksin supporters and security forces that paralyse Bangkok. Since 
his downfall, Thaksin’s rivalry with the military and network monarchy have defined 
Thai politics. Following the downfall of his sister, Yingluck, the new military junta, 
under Prayuth Chan-ocha, has reversed a number of progressive, democratic laws in 
an attempt to prevent the Shinawatra family and its allies from coming into power 
again, as well as introduced a number of draconian laws, which are similar to those 
written in the 1950s and 1960s.170 The polarization of Thai society and the network 
monarchy’s fear of losing political power will continue to hamper efforts to 
democratize. Nonetheless, the strength and mobilizational power of pro-democracy 
members of the middle class and CSOs will likely prevent Thailand’s democracy to 
regress any further than “half-democracy”. 
 
Conclusion 
 
A series of events, policies, and actions in Southeast Asia from 2000 and 2010 have 
shown that Third wave euphoria have been premature. The fall of strongly-
consolidated patrimonialistic governments in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand 
created numerous obstacles for young democracies, which include the prominence of 
informal actors, weak political parties, and the prevalence of ethnic conflict. While the 
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outcomes of the democratization process in all three countries are different, this 
chapter has identified common variables that threaten key democratic institutions. 
Poor civil-military relations and weak political parties pose the biggest threats to 
democratic institutions in all case studies. Ethnic conflicts and the effects of Asian 
values have also harmed democratic institutions to some degree. On the other hand, it 
seems that socioeconomic factors have only weakened democratic institutions in 
Thailand and, to a degree, the Philippines. The next chapter of this paper will provide 
a comparative study that will determine what common factors threaten to halt or 
regress the democratization process in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand. 
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4 
Comparative Analysis 
 
In the previous chapter, this thesis attempted to identify the variables and causal 
factors that threaten democratic institutions in Indonesia, the Philippines, and 
Thailand. Indeed, socioeconomic, political, and cultural factors all play a role in 
shaping the three countries’ complex process of democratic consolidation. 
Unsurprisingly, there are unique challenges to democratic institutions in each of the 
three case studies. But there seems to be some commonalities as well. This chapter 
will identify what these commonalities are in order to answer the main research 
question of this paper. 
 
Structural Variables: The dominant threats to democracy? 
 
There has been considerable scholarly focus given to the role of structural actors in 
challenging new democratic institutions in Southeast Asia, as scholars are fascinated 
with the role that these actors – many of whom receive greater political power during 
the authoritarian era – play in the democratic consolidation and transition processes. 
Rarely does the fall of an authoritarian government mean the complete consolidation 
of democratic values within all institutions and actors, and the three case studies in 
Southeast Asia seem to reflect so. It seems that structural actors, particularly oligarchic 
actors, pose the most dominant direct threats to democratic institutions. These actors 
are fearful of losing further political power during the period of democracy and as 
such, would use their informal power of resources and networks to prevent further 
loss. 
 
One structural challenge has emerged in all case studies: weak and ineffective political 
parties. In Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, weak political parties have 
resulted in a lack of party loyalty amongst politicians, the increased prevalence of 
money politics, weak opposition parties, and the emergence of informal actors – such 
as oligarchic figures and military – as symbols of conservative or moderate opposition 
to an often radical government. This result seems understandable, as the authoritarian 
governments that preceded the period of democratic transition seem to either be 
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personalistic (e.g. Indonesia and the Philippines) or personalistic-military (e.g. 
Thailand).171 In either case, authority within these governments were exercised 
through patronage networks and coercion, rather than through formal rules or 
institutions. The survival of Marcos’ and Suharto’s governments were dependent on 
the approval and support of a strong power base, such as the military. Similarly, the 
survival of successive military governments in Thailand was dependent on approval 
from the network monarchy. Their ruling political parties were largely vehicles to 
manage elite relations and opposition parties were often symbolic and virtually made 
weak. This seems to confirm Crouch and Morley’s observation, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, that the collapse of authoritarian governments is marked by a fractured elite 
and the government’s failure to manage elite relationships.  
 
The result of elite fragmentation on the democratization process is twofold. Firstly, 
elites and other actors from the past authoritarian regime bring their schisms to the 
electoral process. Elections are expensive, but these figures often possess the 
necessary resources to compete, or have a proxy, to preserve their political power. 
This was evident in all three case studies, such as the dominance of oligarchs in 
Indonesia’s political parties, the dominance of political dynasties in the Philippines’ 
political arena, and the emergence of populist counter-elite forces in Thailand. 
Secondly, weak political parties are forced to form wobbly coalitions that are driven 
by money politics to counter the dominant parties of the authoritarian era. These two 
results of elite fragmentation pose a direct short and long term threat to democratic 
institutions as it weakens the oppositions’ ability to properly review government 
behaviour, tarnishes public perceptions of the legislature as a corrupt institution, and 
distances itself from disenfranchised voters. The lack of proper governance and 
disillusionment of governmental and parliamentary capability to address the issues of 
the state provides non-state actors, including oligarchs, greater impetus to use their 
material resources to pursue further political power. In some cases, officers within the 
military – seen in many parts of Southeast Asia as a moderate actor that brings stability 
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– may believe that it is the prerogative of the military to interfere and bring back 
political stability to the state. This was the case in the Philippines, when they 
intervened in Estrada’s overthrow. 
 
This brings up the question of whether the political influence of the military continues 
to pose a threat to democratic institutions. In all three case studies, only the Thai 
military poses a significant challenge to democratic institutions, which threaten to 
bring full regression in the democratization process. The military’s influence on 
politics in Indonesia and the Philippines is less severe, but remains damaging. In an 
attempt to earn their loyalty and maintain a stable relationship with the military, 
Arroyo, Megawati, and Yudhoyono have provided them institutional autonomy. 
Under Arroyo and Megawati, the military had enhanced decision-making power on 
security-related matters and political and economic protection, which somewhat 
mimics – to a lesser degree – what Suharto and Marcos had done to stabilize their 
relationship with the military. There are negative implications of doing so, as 
conservative senior military officers have been shown to possess hawkish approaches 
toward security issues, as seen with the escalation of conflict in Aceh and Mindanao. 
Additionally, by continuing a tradition of a “political class” of soldiers, the Indonesian 
and Philippine governments have risked doing exactly what Huntington, Chambers, 
and Croissant had warned, which was that it would create a division within the military 
between the professional and political classes. Such risks are more felt in the 
Philippines, where rogue factions of the military have undertaken several attempts at 
Mutiny during the post-Marcos era, including three times under Arroyo. 
 
The implications of allowing the military to possess a political role can further upset 
the democratization process, which is already harmed by weak political parties. The 
empirical evidences in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand seem to suggest that 
structural variables pose a short and long term threat to democratic institutions. They 
are the dominant threats to democratic institutions in the region and pose an even 
bigger threat than the socioeconomic and cultural and ethnic variables below. 
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Socioeconomic Variables: Is Southeast Asia still an anomaly? 
 
Scholars of political science have long argued over the role socioeconomic variables 
play in preserving democratic institutions. To the modernization theorists who believe 
in the causal relationship between socioeconomic development and democracy, 
Southeast Asia remains an anomaly as it is home to wealthy hybrid regimes, like 
Singapore, and poor democracies, like Timor-Leste. Nonetheless, as mentioned in 
Chapter 2, scholars of Southeast Asian politics seem to agree that economic 
performance is a key priority for all governments, regardless of regime type. Indeed, 
economic performance has contributed to regime stability in the past. UMNO, 
Suharto, PAP, and even Marcos in his early years were dependent on positive 
economic growth and stability for their survival. However, in the present day, it seems 
that there are only few causal links between poor socioeconomic development or 
income inequality and democratic regression. In all three Southeast Asian countries, 
income inequality continues to be prevalent. However, the political side effects of 
income inequality is most problematic in Thailand, where Thaksin and other populist 
figures have polarized Thai society. The political implications of income inequality is 
not as disastrous in Indonesia and the Philippines. While income inequality has 
generated forms of ethnic conflicts in these areas, they have largely subsided during 
the period between 2000 and 2010. Even the separatist conflicts in Papua and 
Mindanao have largely eased down, despite some widening in the income gap. 
 
Perhaps the explanation behind this lies in the level of modernization that these three 
countries have endured. In the past, when large segments of the population remained 
poor, modernization remained underdeveloped, and ideological or corrupt democrats 
posed significant threats to economic and political stability. Thus, there was great 
support for their removal from office. Unlike in the past, where large segments of the 
population supported the overthrow of democratic institutions in these three countries, 
the past ten years have seen significant economic growth and an expansion of a middle 
class that is non-supportive of authoritarian rule. Presently, all three countries are 
classified as “middle income countries” by the World Bank, with Indonesia possessing 
a GDP per capita of 3,475, Thailand $5,779, and the Philippines $2,765.172 If we were 
                                                          
172 "Middle Income". World Bank, accessed 18 October 2014. http://data.worldbank.org/country/mic. 
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to apply Przeworski et al.’s argument to the three case studies, each of these countries 
would have a maximum life expectancy of 20 years before regressing or halting due 
to political crisis173. Only Thai democracy has regressed and even so, scholars argue 
that Thailand is unlikely to regress beyond a “half-democracy”.174 An expanding 
middle class continues to demand greater political and economic autonomy from the 
state and as surveys mentioned in the previous chapter have shown, there is vast 
support for democratic institutions in Southeast Asia. It is possible that a democratic 
regime would not survive if the government fails to properly address and/or prevent a 
severe economic crisis from occurring. However, there is yet to be an example in 
recent years to prove this. Similarly, severe income inequality would polarize a 
country and lead to political instability that dismantles democratic institutions. But as 
this has only occurred in Thailand, this paper concludes that socioeconomic variables 
are not common threats to democratic institutions in Southeast Asia. 
 
Cultural and Ethnic Factors: Shaping political culture 
 
Democracy seems to be a very popular form of government for many Southeast 
Asians, as the Asian Barometer surveys this paper shown has proven, but we must also 
consider the ethnic and cultural challenges to democratic institutions as well. From 
2000 until 2010, there seems to be growing support for democratic institutions in 
Southeast Asia, which may seem to put the Asian values arguments at rest. However, 
a history of acceptance of Asian values has had negative implications on the 
democratic process. The Asian values political culture was primarily predominant in 
Malaysia, Singapore, and to an extent, Indonesia. However, communitarian political 
culture and paternalistic leadership style that surround the Asian values seem to be 
prevalent in other political cultures in the region. The personalistic leaderships of 
Marcos and Suharto, as well as the personalistic-military leaderships of the successive 
Thai military juntas emphasize on the importance of centralized rule and subservience 
to a hierarchy. This political culture has led to the importance of patron-client relations 
in determining key posts, including within the bureaucracy. Thus, key posts would be 
                                                          
173 Przeworski et al. "What makes democracies endure?". 
  
174 Takashi, Shiraishi. "The Asian Crisis Reconsidered". (working paper, Research Institute of 
Economy, Trade, and Industry, 2003) http://www.rieti.go.jp/jp/publications/dp/05e014.pdf 
71 
 
based on loyalty and networks, rather than merit. As was discussed in the case studies 
on the Philippines under Arroyo, Indonesia under Megawati, and Thailand under 
Thaksin, this hampers attempts at good governance and weaken the abilities of the 
state to properly ensure rule of law. 
 
Ethnic tensions seem to also pose a threat to democratic institutions in all three case 
studies, where young democratic governments are instantly faced with challenges 
from separatist groups and ethnic tensions, which not only threaten political stability 
in certain regions, but also test the abilities and political influence of elected civilians 
in office. In Southern Thailand, Mindanao, and several regions in Indonesia, such as 
Aceh and Papua, ethnic conflicts have led to an escalation of armed conflict between 
rebels and government forces. Under intense internal pressure, governments may be 
forced to adopt aggressive measures to address these challenges. Under Thaksin, 
Estrada, Megawati, and (eventually) Wahid, ongoing tensions have led to the 
introduction of authoritarian and hawkish policies, which have seen gross human 
rights abuses and attacks on civil and political liberties. As a result, the by-products 
and challenges posed by ethnic tensions have posed direct threats as well to democratic 
institutions. 
 
How have democratic institutions continued to survive? 
 
This paper has found that of the three approaches, only the structural, cultural, and 
ethnic variables present threats to democratic institutions in all three case studies. 
Nonetheless, the structural variables, particularly the weakness of political parties, 
pose the biggest threats to democratic institutions. These four variables have resulted 
in the continued prevalence of personalistic parties, weak oppositions, bad 
governance, and ethnic violence. The effects of these problems have resulted in public 
disillusionment of the democratic regime, as it seems to have failed to address the 
political and economic woes of the authoritarian era. Although these variables have 
significantly slowed the pace of democratization in the three case studies, the 
democratization processes of all these three countries are far from regressing 
completely. 
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Perhaps, in this case, the political modernists have it right. The expansion of a middle 
class from outside the state bureaucracy during the period of industrialization in the 
1980s and 1990s (or 1950s, in the case of the Philippines) have led to demands of 
greater political and economic autonomy from the state. This has led to the formation 
of CSOs that demand greater political and economic freedoms, as well as protection 
of civil and political rights. The protests that saw the end of the Marcos, Suchinda, and 
Suharto governments were largely driven by the middle class and their CSO vehicles, 
which expanded their political and mobilizational power by acting as watchdogs and 
providing technical support for reform-driven changes. In all three countries, CSOs 
have played active roles to gradually remove power away from oligarchs or other elite 
actors through the strengthening of independent government agencies, such as 
Indonesia’s Corruption Eradication Commission, and through the passing of laws 
which enhance the importance of participatory politics and the role of CSOs, such as 
the 1997 Constitution of Thailand. These factors not only strengthen democratic 
institutions, but they also play an important socializing factor that enhances public 
support for democracy. In this case, while the democratization process is not 
guaranteed to continuously progress in more affluent countries, Przeworski et al. may 
be correct when they argue that a country’s economic development greatly determines 
the likelihood of democratic survival. 
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Conclusion 
 
As the euphoria over the Third Wave in Southeast Asia was quickly subsided by 
creeping fears of regression, the literature on democratic survival in Southeast Asia 
grew increasingly large and rich, with scholars bringing forward new analysis and 
approaches to conceptualize democratic survival, amidst continuing economic or 
structural challenges, ethnic conflict, and the spectre of past authoritarian oligarchs 
and elites. While, the political diversity of Southeast Asia has made it difficult to find 
justification for a single conceptualization of democracy for the region’s 
democratizing or liberalizing political entities, this substantial variation in regime 
outcomes provides enormous opportunities for the study of Southeast Asian 
democracy. The key contribution of this paper is its particular focus on the problematic 
period between 2000 and 2010. It was during this time that we begin to see the 
deceleration of democratization processes in all three countries. By conducting a vast 
comparative analysis of the impacts of the six structural, socioeconomic, and cultural 
and ethnic variables in Indonesia, the Philippines, and Thailand, this paper has 
managed to identify the key commonalities in the region’s decelerating democracies. 
 
This non-traditional approach to the study of democratization in Southeast Asia allows 
us to further investigate the variables that decelerate the region’s democratization 
process. This paper has managed to identify six key variables, within the broad 
literature of Southeast Asian democracy, that threaten democratic survival. However, 
this paper has found that only four of these six variables – weak political parties, the 
political influence of the military, ethnic conflict, and the authoritarian influence of 
the “Asian values” on state institutions – threaten democratic institutions in the region. 
On the other hand, the two dominant socioeconomic variables of income inequality 
and lower levels of modernization only influence the democratization processes of few 
countries. While the socioeconomic approach remains largely dominant in the study 
of democratic survival, this paper has found that Southeast Asia largely remains an 
anomaly, as income inequality and lower levels of modernization have not directly 
posed a threat to democracy in the Philippines and Indonesia. Rather, from this paper’s 
historical-comparative analysis, it has identified that structural variables have posed 
the most significant threats to democratic institutions. Structural actors that were 
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prominent under past authoritarian governments rarely go down with the authoritarian. 
Rather, they continue to shape the post-authoritarian political arena by taking 
advantage of the electoral process and weak political parties to assume or consolidate 
power. Additionally, a political culture of communitarianism and paternalistic 
leadership style has somewhat continued traditions of patron-client politics, which 
may hamper attempts of good governance. The eagerness of new democratic regimes 
to prove that it is able to confront political and security challenges have also increased 
efforts to address challenges from insurgent and ethnic groups, which often end in an 
escalation of armed conflict. All these challenges have led to instances of bad 
governance, severe violations of political and civil liberties, and the emergence of 
informal actors as counterbalances to the democratic government. These issues have 
led to greater public disillusionment with the democratic regime, as it is incapable of 
addressing the similar political and economic woes of the past authoritarian 
government. Nonetheless, it is unlikely that democratization is going to completely 
regress, as the emergence of a politically active middle class and the increasing 
political influence of pro-reform CSOs are likely to preserve and campaign for the 
protection of key tenets of democracy, such as freedom of expression and political 
participation. 
 
What do the findings of this paper tell us about the factors that challenge democratic 
institutions in Southeast Asia? While there seems to be widespread public support for 
democracy and its key institutions of political participation and freedom of expression, 
the public are thus far disappointed with the progress of democratization in their 
countries. The collapse of a strong authoritarian government that manages to weaken 
and fracture its opposition has meant that it is not only unprepared to deal with the 
array of economic, ethnic, and political challenges that it faces, but it also continues 
to be influenced by figures from the authoritarian past. For Thailand and the 
Philippines, the period between 2000 and 2010 reflected the power struggle between 
traditional elite forces and the new, including segments of the middle class. The 
deceleration – or regression, in the case of Thailand – of the democratization process 
was caused by the urge of informal actors to reclaim its diminishing influence. It was 
not caused by socioeconomic matters. Indonesia’s relative success with the 
democratization process may be caused by the youthfulness of its democracy. The last 
few years of the Yudhoyono presidency has been marred by rising religious tensions 
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and the re-emergence of oligarchic actors. The progress of democratization in the 
2010s will expose whether informal actors are content with their diminishing political 
power. 
 
 
The findings of this paper will contribute to ongoing debates over the causes of 
democratic survival in Southeast Asia. However, as a comparative analysis of a region, 
this paper also seeks to contribute to debates over the role of democratic regimes in 
the democratic socialization of other states. The regression or deceleration of the 
democratization processes in key ASEAN countries pose a threat to the ongoing 
liberalization of the Association and the region. This paper hopes that by identifying 
the root causes of the three biggest democracies in Southeast Asia, we will have a 
better understanding of how young democratic institutions in the region are operated. 
The role of structural actors continue to matter in Southeast Asia, as informal political 
actors continue to hold considerable political sway. There has to be greater attention 
given to the role of these actors within discussions of democratic socialization. This is 
perhaps an area for future research for scholars on Southeast Asian democracy.  
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